Reconsidering the transformational potential of queer shame by Côté, Louis Pierre
UNIVERSIT~ DU QU~BEC À TROIS-RIVI~RES 
RECONSIDERING THE TRANSFORMATIONAL POTENTIAL OF QUEER SHAME 
M~MOIRE PR6ENT~ 
COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE DE LA 
MAlTRISE EN PHILOSOPHIE 
PAR 







Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières 






L’auteur de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse a autorisé l’Université du Québec 
à Trois-Rivières à diffuser, à des fins non lucratives, une copie de son 
mémoire ou de sa thèse. 
Cette diffusion n’entraîne pas une renonciation de la part de l’auteur à ses 
droits de propriété intellectuelle, incluant le droit d’auteur, sur ce mémoire 
ou cette thèse. Notamment, la reproduction ou la publication de la totalité 
ou d’une partie importante de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse requiert son 
autorisation.  
This master's thesis is dedicated to ail the queer theorists, academics, activists, 
warriors, and survivors. May your combined accomplishments continue to 
move and engage people as they have moved me. 
This master's thesis is dedicated to anyone who right now feels like an Other, in 
fields of shame suffused by unattainable norms of a society that has you 
estranged. May it contribute enough to your personal experiences to make 
you understand that it truly does get better. 
This master's thesis is dedicated to ail the future queer theorists, academics, 
activists, warriors, and survivors. May my contribution be just significant 
enough to highlight the sufferings of some living in silence and enjoin some 
others to listen. 
ii 
Acknowledgments 
This dissertation culminates and brings together the ideas 1 have been juggling since 1 began my 
graduate studies. It is the result of some three years of extensive and demanding studies, readings and 
personally engaged writings. It is also the first time 1 have begun and completed a writing project of this 
magnitude. 1 could not have completed it without the help of people who deserve recognition. 
1 first wish to affectionately thank my supervisor, Professor Naïma Hamrouni, for her more than 
judicious advices, for her patience despite my various lacks of understanding, and for being such an 
inspiration, continually driving me to go further, to work harder, to read more and to challenge myself in 
the face of new insights. 1 consider this baggage of wisdom and of academic and personal growth to be 
invaluable and truly indispensable in my journey as a young academic. 
1 also extend my warmest gratitude to Professor Marie-Josée Drolet, with whom 1 have worked 
extensively for the last three years, and from whom Ilearned, namely, the basics of diligent research. 
1 must also thank my friends, who hopefully will identify themselves. Our long and elaborate 
exchanges and discussions contributed admirably to my thought development and constituted a pleasant 
comfort in the face of my doubts. 
Finally, 1 would like to lovingly thank my parents, who had to wipe my many waves of emotions 
and my crises of uncertainty. 1 want vou to know that if vou felt at times helpless to answer my doubts or 
questions, your attentive, patient, and loving listening was particularly indispensable to me. 
iii 
Preface 
When 1 was in high school the school organized end-of-year trips to sorne major city (Toronto, 
Boston, New York, etc.) for each grade for a few days. Hotel rooms were allotted to teams of four students, 
so we had to find partners. By this time, 1 had already come out for a while: the trip organizers knew about 
it, as did ail my classmates. The same was true for a friend of mine who was openly lesbian. 1 was not 
comfortable sharing a room with boys 1 was not friends with, and neither was she. We came up with the 
idea of teaming up and sharing a room ... . The organizing committee did not want to hear anything on the 
open pretext that it wou Id be too 'risky' for a boy and a girl to share a room on a school trip, and that even 
if we had signed permission from our parents (which we had), it was against school board policy. In the 
end, 1 shared a room with another openly gay boy with whom it was much more likely that something 
wou Id happen. The organizers did not seem to care. 
1 began my preface with this story to eloquently show how queer people's lives can become 
intertwined with heteronormativity. The more 1 read and wrote about heteronormativity, about shame, 
about the ideal of masculinity, and about the oppression that these seemingly almost disjointed concepts 
can engender, the more 1 came to understand how 1 have always struggled with them. That, in fa ct, 1 have 
so far lived my life both crumbling under and resisting the heteronormative system. Moments of 
overwhelming shame, anger, incomprehension, and indignation made me question myself and my place 
in a society that apparently constantly questions my very existence. And which consistently persists in 
highlighting my non-adherence to its rigid and strict standards dictated by heteronormativity, which makes 
me feel, as queer feminists put it, both highly visible and invisible at the same time (Hennessy 2017, cf. 
Rich 1980). The fact that 1 do not frt: in with such standards, of course, is something for which 1 should be 
made to feel ashamed. Or so tells me the heteronormative system or the heterosexist discourses within 
which 1 daily evolve. However, such words as 'heteronormativity' or 'heterosexism' were not yet mine 
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back then, when 1 first started realizing that my certain 'Iifestyle' was at odds with the societal norms that 
surrounded me. To that point, nor was the idea of shame already mine to combine with ideas of oppression 
originating in that heteronormative system. 1 was not there veto But 1 still reflected on myself (and still do) 
wh en 1 became confronted with what 1 would now like to cali 'epiphanies of heteronormativitv', either 
expressed explicitly through heterosexist discourses or expressed implicitly in my understanding that 
behaving in a certain way might involve my being socially judged, or excluded. But more than that, it is as 
if certain existences and identities did not (and could not) exist within heteronormative systems. Indeed, 
they are so powerful and their grasps so all-encompassing that sorne realities have no place to exist, and 
are in fact ignored, silenced and erased. 
1 remembered the "high school trip" experience when 1 first was introduced to Adrienne Rich's 
article entitled 'Compulsory heterosexualityl' (Rich 1980). In this article, she develops the concept of 
"compulsory heterosexuality" to referto how society takes the sexual desire between a man and a woman 
for granted and as a necessity, as if there were no other possibility for the sexual fulfillment of oneself. She 
shows how compulsory heterosexuality contributes to the invisibilisation of ail other sexual identities, 
which then become (socially constructed as) deviant (Rich 1980: 632). Compulsory heterosexuality is at 
play in the school board rooming poliCV, which would not let an openly gay student share a room with an 
openly lesbian student. In fact, it is so deeply and insidiously entrenched in people's minds that it 
sometimes may lead to decisions that are contrary to what it originally meant to avoid (in this case, sexual 
relations between students). 
lin her text entitled 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence', in which she contends that heterosexuality 
must be understood above ail as a political institution that serves as a tool allowing for men to dominate women, Rich 
offers a new way of thinking about heterosexuality following an analysis of male domination within ail spheres of 
women's lives. Her text, indeed, first published in 1980 in Signs, figures amongst some of the most influential and 
defining of Rich's career, which, spanning nearly 70 years, has had influence both in poetry and in philosophy while 
mainly concerned with issues affecting women's lives and what she calls the lesbian existence. 
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Compulsory heterosexuality is also reflected in the inability of such school policy to believe that a 
boy and a girl can be just friends. The incapacity to conceive of this, which in turn sets up separation rules 
between boys and girls, reinforces and feeds the heteronormative biases that permeate society. Indeed, 
su ch biases feed off compulsory heterosexuality which encourages schools to keep boys and girls apart, as 
if their not caring about it would unfurl a series of sexually debauched events. [This need for separation 
itself contains many outdated heteronormative and patriarchal premises that are often not dared to 
question, namely the underlying idea that "boys will be boys", which reinforces the idea that their sexual 
'urges' are masculine (essential, biological and inescapable) and natural (immutable), and that (thereby) 
they cannot (and should not) be controlled.] 
Growing up gay, 1 have "encountered" heteronormativity often and came to realize how it enforces 
socially constructed norms as if they were undeniable laws of nature. 1 have encountered it when 1 first 
came out to my dad at seven, only to be told that 1 was too young to know for sure2• When my strong 
desire to wear makeup is met with equally strong feelings of inadequacy. When 1 am shamed publicly for 
unknowingly wanting to buy women shoes or earrings because they're colorful and beautiful. When l'm 
told l'm too loud. That my laugh is too high-pitched. And 1 feel profoundly surrounded by heteronorms 
when l'm told that l "walk gay." 
Shame and outrage now seem inseparable to me. To be publicly shamed simply because of what 
one looks like or because of whom one decides to love and have sex with is an outrage. It is outrageous 
that heteronormativity demands for people to behave in certain ways when it cornes to gender identity 
performances or sexual desires. And it is even more outrageous that heteronormativity disseminates 
shame to those seemed subversive. Many end up performing adaptative preferences (cf. Khader 2011) to 
2 On that note, why is it that only queer children are too young to know? Why is it perfectly fine for a 4-year-old girl 
(my niece) to have little boyfriends in kindergarten, while l'm (supposedly) too young to know that l'm gay at seven? 
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soothe away their burning shame. Nonetheless, it remains outrageous to notice that many queer people 
live beside themselves in social roles and personal identities which they have not made their own. Which 
have been imposed on them socially, and which they use to 'pass'. Outrage still when a person constructs 
their personal identity through the internalization of shame. 
1 end this preface with the powerful words of Hannah Gadsby: "1 sat soaking in shame ... in the closet, 
for ten years. Because the closet [ ... ] is not shame-proof. When vou soak a child in shame, they cannot 
develop the neurological pathways that [ ... ] carry thoughts of self-worth." (Bruzzese et al. 2018) This is 
what my dissertation is about. It is about shame. It is about heteronormativity. And it is about queer 
people. It is about how queer people are made to internalize shame, which in turn reinforces 
heteronormative systems. Until there is an adequate understanding of ail facets of shame, but more 
importantly, of the ways in which queer people are systemically shamed and the place that this shame 
occupies in the reproduction of heteronormative oppression, we cannot hope to live in a world where 
everyone is fortunate enough to feel that their lives have value. 
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Abstract 
ln this dissertation, 1 discuss shame as it is experienced by queer people. WhiJe some recognize 
the transformative potential of liqueer shame"(Sedgwick 1993, cf. Halperin & Traub 2009), 1 suggest that 
it can only truly play this role if this emotion is first understood as painful for queer people, whose lives 
within heteronormative societies are particularly marked by linonconformity". In the first chapter, 1 
examine the main conceptions of shame in psychology (Freud 1905, 1933; Tomkins 1962, 1963, 1991; 
Kaufman 1989), philosophy (Sartre 1943; Williams 1993; Nussbaum 2004), and feminisms (Bartky 1990; 
Manion 2003; Mann 2018; Weiss 2018). This allows me to reconstruct an adequate definition of shame 
with which 1 can discuss queer shame. In the second chapter, looking specifically at the lived experiences 
of shame amongst queer people, 1 discuss the works of some who believe that shame can potentially be 
transformational (Sedgwick 1993). 1 take this understanding to be insufficient without a proper 
understanding of queer shame as painful and stemming from heteronormativity (Ahmed 2004; Foucault 
1978, cf. Fanon 1952). More specifically, 1 argue that: (1) it is a painful emotion intimately connected to 




Dans ce mémoire, je traite de la honte ressentie par les personnes queer. Si certaines autrices 
reconnaissent le potentiel transformateur de la « honte queer » (Sedgwick 1993, cf. Halperin & Traub 
2(09), je suggère qu'elle ne pourra véritablement jouer ce rôle que si cette émotion est d'abord comprise 
comme étant douloureuse pour les personnes queer - personnes dont la vie au sein de sociétés 
hétéronormatives est particulièrement marquée par la « non-conformité ». Dans le premier chapitre, 
j'examine les principales conceptions de la honte provenant des champs de la psychologie (Freud 1905, 
1933; Tomkins 1962, 1963; Kaufman 1989), de la philosophie (Sartre 1943; Williams 1993; Nussbaum 
2(04) et des féminismes (Bartky 1990; Manion 2003; Mann 2018; Weiss 2018). Cela me permet de dégager 
une définition adéquate pour traiter de la honte queer. Dans le deuxième chapitre, en me penchant plus 
spécifiquement sur l'expérience vécue de la honte chez les personnes queer, je présente les travaux 
d'autrices qui considèrent que la honte possède un potentiel transformateur (Sedgwick 1993). J'estime 
que cette compréhension est insuffisante si elle ne permet pas de voir que la honte queer est avant tout 
douloureuse et qu'elle découle de l'hétéronormativité (Ahmed 2004; Foucault 1978, cf. Fanon 1952). Plus 
précisément, je défends que: (1) elle est une émotion douloureuse intimement liée aux structures sociales 
hétéronormatives et (2) que, contrairement à ce qui est généralement tenu pour acquis, cette émotion 
peut constituer le fondement d'une contestation politique de l'hétéronormativité de nos sociétés. 
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(Arguments- and Research-Based) Glossary 
ln this section, 1 propose a list of words and their detinitions or conceptualizations that 1 use in the 
following pages, that inspire my writing or that 1 believe could benetit my reader's comprehension. Please 
note that they are in no way exhaustive or detinitive. They are but my humble attempt at offering sorne 
conceptual clarity. 
2SLGBTQlA+ 
This is the acronym 1 use in this dissertation to refer to people who self-identify with or are 
identitied with sexual or gender identities that are socially minoritized. Its letters and symbols mean to 
encompass, amongst others, Two-spirit people, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, Trans· people, intersex 
people, asexual people, and queer people. Although these people are put together under this "umbrella" 
acronym, one should not omit that (1) they represent diverse and unique persons, (2) whose desires and 
identities may not always be adequately represented by it. Additionally, one should bear in mind that not 
everyone agrees with the use of this acronym, as (1) it may contribute to invisibilize sorne people in the 
midst of promoting others, and because (2) it does not show the sometimes conflicting relationships 
between the people represented under each symbols (cf. Jeffreys 1994, 2014). Finally, sorne use other 
"variations" of the acronym, such as lGBT, or lGBTQIA, etc. 1 prefer to use the longest acronym possible, 
to avoid omitting people. However, by and large, as is discussed in the introduction and through this 
master's thesis, 1 preferto use queer, since it allows, namely, for more politicalleverage. 
Agender 
Comprised within a broader understanding of gender as non-binary (see Non-blnary), agender 
people do not subscribe to currently (socially) held gender norms, and their gender identity will thus be 
neither masculine or feminine (or undetined). 
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Amatonormativity 
Coined by Elizabeth Brake in her 2011 book Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the 
Law, amatonormativity refers to the "[ ... ] belief that marriage and companionate romantic love have 
special value" and the "assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, 
in that it is a universally shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed 
at in preference to other relationship types" (Brake 2012: ). To put it differently, Brake questions the social 
necessity of being in relationships, and points that to pressure people into forming, say monogamous 
married couples, may make sorne people, who do not fit this valorized scheme, at odds and, thus, seem 
abnormal (i.e. asexual (see Asexuality), aromantic (see Aromantic) or nonmonogamous people). 
Androgyne 
Aiso comprised under non-binary gender identities (see Non-binary), androgyne gender blends, 
blurs or annuls the lines between gender bina ries. An androgyne person, may identify as both masculine 
and feminine, as neither, as both female and male, as neither, or as something else. 
Aromantic 
Aromantic people generally do no desire to engage in romantic relationships but may experience 
sexual desires and attractions. 
Asexuality 
Someone who identifies as asexual (or ace) generally do es not feel or experience sexual attraction 
towards others (or have little to no interest for it). Asexuality is sometimes misconceived sim ply as a desire 
"notto date anyone atthe moment" or mixed up with aromantic understandings of love. However, asexual 
people may engage in romantic relations, but they will hardly develop a sexual component. 
Bigender 
xii 
People who identify as bigender, which, again, can be incorporated under the umbrella of non-
binary (see Non-binary), have two gender identities, sometimes at the same time, sometimes 
alternatively. There is a kind of gender fluidity (see Genderfluid) in the expression of this identity. 
Moreover, white it is often assumed that the two genders of a bigender person are masculine and 
feminine, it should be qualified that, for sorne people, the pair may indude two non-binary gender 
identities. 
Cisgender 
We consider a person to be cisgender, as opposed to trans· (see Trans· below), when the gender 
they were assigned at birth, their biological sex and bodies, and their personal identity ail fit together. 
Femininity 
Femininity refers to what one performs, following socially enforced norms, in order to be seen as 
feminine. It is important to see that femininity does not correspond exdusively to being a woman. Women 
can perform their gender identity in a feminine way, but men can also demonstrate femininity. In fact, 
people with f1uid gender expression may even daim sorne of the social norms and conventions that make 
up the scripts of femininity. Moreover, femininity is not just for cis-gender people, as trans· people can 
also express it. As such, femininity may encompass the gender expressions of many diverse individuals. 
Really, though, the central element in understanding femininity is the hierarchically subordinate place it 
occupies vis-à-vis masculinity. Indeed, in heteronormative Western societies, masculinity generally 
dominates femininity: masculine gender expressions are valued white feminine gender expressions are 
often heavity criticized (or even belittled), and men who embody masculine ideals tend to occupy better 
social positions than others (e.g., "effeminate men or women who are perceived as "masculine") (cf. Dea 
2016, Windsor 2015). 
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Genderfluid 
People who identify as genderfluid may experience and express their gender identity (which, 
aga in, is not necessarily masculine or feminine) in a vast array of possibilities, at different times, on 
different occasions and with different people. 
Heteronormativity 
Heteronormativity comprises the words "heterosexuality" and "normativity". Heterosexuality, 
which is composed of "hetero" (i.e., d iffere nt) and "sexuality" (i.e., pertaining to sex [from latin 
"sexualis"]), refers to a sexual or emotional attraction to a person of the opposite sex. Etymologically, 
normative can refer to the latin word "narma", which means "rule", and to the Ancient Greek word 
"gnomon", which translates into "something that guides". Thus, the (etymological) meaning of 
heteronormativity would probably be the normalizatian (as a natural sociol rule) of the sexual or emotional 
attractions of opposite sexes. 
ln fact, in developing queer theory as an academic discipline, queer theorists greatly relied on 
historical and genealogical approaches, since many wished to question the (self-evident) natural 
development (as opposed to socially constructed) of heterosexuality (Mayer 2018: 85). In fact, sorne, like 
Jonathan Ned Katz (1995) and louis-George Tin (2008), pointed out that heterosexuality, far from being 
natural, has been socially and culturally constructed through time. If heterosexuality has been invented, it 
means, then, that it is held in place through social practices, norms and conventions. It also means that 
things could be otherwise. 
Queer theorists, thus, generally understand heteronormativity as a broad concept which brushes 
up against severallayers of human life. For Michael Warner, heteronormativity is the "[ ... J elemental form 
of human association, as the very model of intergender relations, as the indivisible basis of ail community, 
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and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn't exist" (Warner 1991: xxi). In other 
words, this means that heteronormativity is an encompassing and almost undetectable normative system 
(Mayer 2018: 83). As a system, it "organizes sex, gender and sexuality in order to match heterosexual 
norms" (do Mar Castro Varela, Dhawan & Engel 2011: 11). This system contributes to the creation and 
reinforcement of a rigid equation between a person's biological sex and her gender expression. More 
specifically, it consists of socially instituted norms that make heterosexuality seem inevitable (cf. Corber & 
Valocchi 2003). That make heterosexuality appear normal and natural (cf. Berlant & Warner 1998). This 
means that any behaviour, attitude or coupling that does not fall under the scope of the heterosexual 
norm may be seen as nonconform. Indeed, "living within heteronormativity culture means learning to see 
straight, to read straight, to think straight" (Sumara & Davis 1999: 202). 
Early discussions of heteronormativity also sought to criticize heterosexual privileges. For instance, 
Michael Warner discussed the totalizing tendency of heterosexual privileges: "[ ... ] so much of heterosexual 
privilege lies in the heterosexual culture's exclusive ability to interpret itself as society. Even when cou pied 
with a toleration of minorities sexualities, heteronormativity hos 0 totalizing tendency [ ... ]" (Warner 
1991: 8; my emphasis). 
Heterosexism 
Heterosexism is a form of discrimination targeting people who are (or are viewed as) not 
heterosexual. Heterosexist discriminations comprise and is reinforced by attitudes or ideas which favour 
heterosexuality. It propagates the idea that one is heterosexual until proven otherwise (Welzer-Lang 1994: 
57). Heterosexist discriminations, discourses and attitudes can be internalized. In this case, internalized 
heterosexism refers to the fact that a person from a sexual minority group cornes to accept and integrate 
the negative prejudices or discriminations towards queer people and non-conforming gender and sexual 
identities (Murgo et al. 2017). 
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Homonormativity 
For Lisa Duggan, who coined the term, homonormativity points to lia po 1 itics that does not contest 
dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising 
the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in 
domesticity and consumption contestation" (Duggan 2002: 179). 
Intersex 
Following feminist philosopher Shannon Dea, we consider intersex to refer "to people born with 
ambiguous genitalia, with sex chromosome abnormalities, or with some misalignment between their sex 
chromosomes and their anatomy" (Dea 2016: 83). Dea further notes that intersex people generally fall 
under three categories: (1) individuals whose reproductive organs are ambiguous due to the way their sex 
chromosomes are organized (e.g., congenital adrenal hyperplasia); (2) individuals whose reproductive 
organs are ambiguous but whose sex chromosomes do not have "abnormalities" (e.g., vaginal agenesis); 
and (3) individuals whose reproductive organs are not irregular, but whose sex chromosomes are (e.g., 
Turner's syndrome). Further, intersex is a term that is now preferred to hermaphrodite, which was at risk 
of "representing people so categorized as somehow mystical or exotic" (Dea 2016: 102). 
Masculinity (see Femininity) 
Masculinity refers to what one performs, following socially enforced norms, in order to be seen as 
masculine. In other words, masculinity it is not related to the biological sex "male" but involves masculine 
behaviors (Morris & Blume Oeur 2018: xi). Such behaviors can be performed by anyone, independently of 
their biological sex or their birth-assigned gender. Further, what ought to be noticed in this definition is 
the expression "socially enforced". What that means is that people do not always voluntarily choose to 
perform their gender in the way they do, but sometimes are socially compelled to. As an illustration, we 
can think of an effeminate young boy who willlearn to "toughen up" to be socially accepted. But we can 
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also think of a woman who feels more comfortable performing gender acts socially seen as masculine. 
As a social construction, masculinity is inscribed, within patriarchally-driven systems, as a set of 
(idealized) norm from which ail persons must situate themselves and which implies the subordination 01 
the leminine. This norm calls for certain behaviours in order to be socially considered masculine, but also 
implies that punitive measures are taken against offenders. Indeed, these punitive measures contribute 
to the emergence of anti-effeminacy thinking, based on the belief that, for example, a man must avoid 
looking or behaving in an effeminate manner at ail costs. According to R. W. Connell, "certain constructions 
of masculinity are hegemonic, while others are subordinated or marginalized" (Connell 1992: 736). That 
is, hegemonic masculinity comprises practices which contribute to the persistence of women' s dominance 
by men. 
As part of the heterosexual system, anti-effeminacy translates as follows: the fact of displaying an 
effeminate image for a man implies that he is perceived as homosexual, and this in a negative way. Already, 
this allows us to see part of the shame emanating from the heteronormative system which, in accordance 
with these anti-effeminacy norms, is laid on queer people who are constantly in danger of deviating from 
the ideal of the division between masculine and feminine. 
Non-Binary 
Non-binary gender identities do not subscribe to socially held norms about gender and do not align 
perfectly with either side of the binary composed of masculinity and femininity. People who identify as 
non-binary, thus, may wish not to follow the lines of the binary conceptions of gender, may blur the lines 
of gender and depart with most commonly held ideas about gender, and may wish to perform many 
genders or none at ail. 
Queer 
According to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, queer means to refuse a monolithic, smoothed out and 
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homogeneous conception of sexuality and gender. To put it differently, queer refers to the idea that the 
multitude of possibilities that can playon people's gender and sexual identities cannot be appropriately 
understood following constraining categories which monolithic heteronorms otherwise impose (Sedgwick 
1994: 7). Rather, she contends that fixed categories need to be shattered and expanded if one is to be 
better able to address and understand the diversity of sexualities and gender expressions. 
Queer theory, then, asks questions about personal identity and its relations with gender and sexual 
desire performances. Mostly, one of the premises of queer theory holds that heteronorms enforce 
significant social bina ries, regarding gender and sexuality, but also concerning class, race, ableism, etc., 
which need to be disrupted or expanded. It interrogates what it means to conform to sexual norms and 
what is involved in disrupting them. It also integrates intersectional perspectives in order to question, 
following Sommerville (2000), how the categories of sex, gender and race relate to one another (cf. 
Johnson & Henderson 2005). 
Shame 
(For a more thorough and well-conceptualized understanding of shame, see chapter 1.) 1 
understand shame to referto a painful emotion which arises when one's failure or "badness" is highlighted 
in front of others' gaze (be it real or imagined). One often experiences shame as an incapacity to reach 
one's ideals (be they personal or social [i.e. internalized]). Ali in ail, shame testifies to one's 
interdependence with others. 
Third Gender 
ln sorne cultures and communities around the world, people identify themselves or are identified 
by terms that fall under the umbrella of the "third gender" (or third sex), insofar as their gender or sexual 
expressions are not exactly comprised within currently he Id expressions of "man" and "woman". This is 
not a matter of blurring the lines of differentiation between binary gendered expressions, as is the case 
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with gender-f1uid people, for instance, but rather of expressing another gender identity. The terms 
Mangaiko, used by the Mbo people of the Democratie Republic of Congo, and Mashoga (plural form of 
Shoga, in Swahili), used by people of sorne regions of Kenya and Tanzania, for example, refer to people 
whose gender and sexual identities would fall under the category of third gender (cf. Murray & Roscoe 
1998). 
Trans· 
We use the asterisk here at the end of the prefix trans to indieate the vast array of gender and 
sexual identities that exists and to highlight that it does not refer to as cisgender man or woman. Trans·, 
then, more specifically designates the words transgender, transman, transwoman, transsexual, 
transmasculine and transfeminine. (It should be noted further that other sexual and/or gender identities 
like gender queer, agender, two-spirit, genderfluid, non-binary, gender non-conforming, bigender, third 
gender, androgynous, etc. do not properly fit under either cisgender or trans·.) 
Two-Spirit 
Two-Spirited people, for many indigenous and aboriginal people in the world, are "seen as being 
neither men nor women, but as belonging to genders of their own within cultural systems of multiple 
genders" (Lang 1997: 114). Two-Spirit identities "[place] the emphasis on gender diversity - rather than 
on sexual orientation - and its inclusion in a cultural and spiritual system" (Depelteau & Giroux 2015: 66). 
ln this sense, Two-Spirit identities ought not to be reduced "to a sexual orientation or equating it with 
'gay,' 'homosexual,' or even 'berdachelll, because "[from] their perspective, sexual behaviour cannot be 
separated from the social roles occupied by Two-Spirited people and the world of relationships to which 
the term ''Iwo-Spirit'' refers (Depelteau & Giroux 2015: 66). 
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Introductory Remarks 
Pride and Shame 
June 1970. Chicago. On a warm sunny day in mid-June, under the scornful, disgusted and, still, 
curious gazes of onlookers and police officers, a group of people whom society deemed sexual deviants 
were gathering. In truth, these people, sorne of whom openly and unashamedly claimed their "non-
conforming" sexual and gender identities, were preparing to embark on one of the first public 
demonstrations in the world to oppose the social injustices they were experiencing and to openly proclaim 
their right to love freely. On that day, after many meetings, the Chicago Gay Liberation gathered sorne 150 
people, carrying banners and signs, and marched from the "Burghouse Square" to the Civic Center (now 
Richard J. Daley Plaza). This march, which today seems small in comparison to the huge gatherings that 
Pride parades can generate in many cities around the world, was echoed by many other gay and lesbian 
rights organizations, and other marches were gradually organized in New York, San Francisco, and 
Philadelphia. In Montreal, the first Pride Parade was he Id in June 1979 to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of Stonewall. Gradually, June became a special time of celebrations for many queer people. 
For our collective social imagina ries, it is in fact more and more synomous with Pride, which, through its 
grandiose marches, gathers people from ail walks of life in partying celebrations ail around the world. But 
June is also a moment to remember the first times gay and lesbian people mobilized publicly against 
marginalization, heteronormative oppressions, and police brutality. Above ail, they marched and chanted 
their pride to affirm that love is love. 
March 2003. Ann Harbor. In late winter, the first and only Gay Shame Conference was held at the 
University of Michigan, which papers are collected in the 2009 book Gay Shame, edited by David Halperin 
and Valerie Traub. During the Conference, many prominent theorists explored the potential of shame to 
deploy "sorne alternate strategies for the promotion of queer sociality" (Halperin & Traub 2009: 4). That 
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said, the conference itself echoed the Gay Shame Movement, whieh sought to rethink the primacy of pride 
within the mainstream gay community. Gay Shame3 contested the assimitationist rhetorie found in many 
of the mainstream gay community's daims to politieal and societal power through pride. Such a 
contestation is echoed in the work of Lisa Duggan, who is credited for coining the word 
"homonormativity". For Duggan, homonormativity points to "a polities that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them white promising the 
possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in 
domesticity and consumption contestation" (Duggan 2002: 179). To put it differently, the Gay Shame 
Movement rejected the hypocrisy of the gay mainstream whieh proudly flaunts its most beautiful features 
so that society wou Id accept it, white at the same time silencing and invisibilizing those within it who are 
deemed subversive and whose "lifestyle" is shamed (i.e. "people with the 'wrong' bodies, sadomasochists, 
sex workers, drag Queens, butch dykes, people of color, boy-Iovers, bisexuals, immigrants, the poor, the 
disabled" [Halperin & Traub 2009: 9]). According to the proponents of Gay Shame, by employing the 
rhetorie of pride so fiercely and by indulging the dominant heteronormative norms and narrative, the gay 
community has come to reproduce the patterns of oppression it originally sought to escape from. Gay 
Shame enjoined many to reconsider differently exactly just how truly queer shame is and how it may be 
important to queer people's conceptions of personal identity. 
Even if Gay Shame movement eventually came to pass, its core ideas concerning queer shame are 
still very much relevant. In fact, Gay Shame, in seeking to interrogate the point and place of shame within 
3 Perhaps some conceptual clarity is needed here, if only to distinguish between the different Iterations of Gay Shame 
that will be found in the present dissertation. Through this master's thesis, whenever 1 use the expression 'Gay Shame', 
1 mean to refer both to the activist movement (Gay Shame Movement) and its ideas, and to the ideas and arguments 
which have emerged both in queer theory and at the Gay Shame Conference. If 1 wish to refer specifically to one of 
them, precisions will be provided. Gay Shame (with italics) is used to refer specifically to the 2009 book edited by David 
M. Halperin and Valerie Traub. If 1 need to refer to the emotion of shame, as experienced by queer people, 1 will use 
(with some exceptions) the expression "queer shame". 
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queer people's lives and experiences, somewhat drew on the works of authors, like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
amongst others, who aimed to conceptualize and understand the transformational and positive potential 
of shame (Sedgwick 1993). However, 1 am not entirely certain that the shame queer people experience 
(qua queer people) ought to be primarily understood as potentially transformative. My point with this 
dissertation is to (1) gain a thoroughly conceptualized understanding of the notion of shame, so as to 
suggest (2) that we may consider the potentially transformative and positive roles of shame for queer 
people only insofar as we first comprehend shame as a painful emotion which queer people feel because 
of the heteronormative structures that surround them. 
Following feminist and Cultural, Gender, and Media Studies Emeritus Professor of English Sally R. 
Munt (2007, 2019),1 understand generally thatfeeling shame is an important experience in the formation 
of personal identity for queer people living in heteronormative societies. According to her, in fa ct, 
"[h]istorically, for homosexuals to be classified within the ordering/signifying [heteronormative] system, 
to be allotted a social place, they must be put into place by shame [ ... ]" (Munt 2019: 227). In fact, 
heteronormativity's hegemony asks people to conform to certain rules, to perform gender and sexuality 
following certain scripts (Butler 1988). Heteronormativity, indeed, should be understood as a large and 
complex system which dictates how one should behave towards oneself and others, how one should feel, 
and how one should think. But it should also be understood as a system which enforces social 
consequences upon those who do not fit within its ideals. For instance, it demands that a man ought to 
marry (amatonormativity, cf. Brake [2012]) a woman and have children with her. It demands of men to be 
masculine and of women to be feminine. Masculinity and femininity, in the context of heteronormativity, 
are gender identity performances which comprise social norms closely and carefully dictating how one 
should perform their gender as a fluid continuation of the biological sexes they were assigned at birth. 
Following Edward Morris and Freeden Blume Oeur, 1 contend that masculinity, while it refers to sOcially 
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constructed norms that can be performed by anyone, sets expectations against which ail must situate 
themselves (Morris & Siume Oeur 2018: x, cf. Haslanger 1995). Young boys are still currently penalized for 
wearing dresses. And girls are usually reprimanded for expressing their anger too loudly (or at ail). 
Masculinity also often involves the subordination or domination of femininity (Mikkola 2019, cf. 
MacKinnon 1989), be it performed by women, trans* women, effeminate men, etc. What is more, it should 
be noted, quite interestingly, that many critical masculinity studies' authors deplore the virtual non-
existence of university academic departments dedicated to the study of masculinity and men, while there 
exist a plethora of academic departments dedicated to feminist, trans* or race studies (Horlacher 2015). 
While this absence may be real (but growing less and less so), it must also be confronted with the fact that 
virtually no definition of femininity exists that is not necessarily tied to a prior understanding of what 
masculinity is (cf. Paetcher 2018). 
The Need te Discuss Shame 
The reflexive process that drove this dissertation, and the underlying thoughts that feed it, 
essentially stem from an inclusive understanding of what it means to live together, recognizing that 
openness to others and their differences is important for the achievement of a just society whose 
members are committed to the fulfillment of ail its citizens (cf. Young 1990, 2000). In this sense, 1 believe 
inclusivity requires a deeper understanding of how shame is comprised within oppressive heteronorms 
that marginalized or discriminated groups, communities or individuals have to compose with. Such a 
comprehension may lead to a better appreciation of the lives of minority people and th us enable the 
identification of strategies aiming to, eventually, eliminate those oppressions. 1 believe that if we are to 
achieve a more inclusive society for marginalized queer people, it is important to understand what shame 
is, especially since their existence and identity development seem to depend, within heteronormative 
societies (where one is heterosexual and cis-gender until proven otherwise) on the confession of one's 
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difference (often expressed as a 'coming out'). 
Experiencing acute shame over extended periods of time can have serious consequences both for 
the physical and mental health. Where physical health is concerned, shame can render one more prone to 
risky and self-destructive behaviours, su ch as addiction to alcohol or drugs, and eating disorders (Dolezal 
& Lyons 2017; Masheb 1999). For Dolezal and Lyons, in fact, shame "is 50 pervasive, so corrosive of the 
self and so potentially detrimental to health, that there is considerable utility in considering it an affective 
determinant of health", because it can be linked with other destructive behaviours like alcoholism or drug 
abuse (Dolezal & Lyons 2017: 257). 
Further, shame can be detrimental to a person's mental health, as studies have shown that it 
increases the risk for a person to experience depression and anxiety and can even lead to suicidai ideation 
(Dickerson 2004; Lewis 1971; Mokros 1995; 5cheff 2001). Sorne even consider shame a "transdiagnostic 
phenomenon", i.e. as part of many psychopathology diagnostics, such a depression (for which shame is 
important, both as a symptom and as an obstacle to recovery) (Yakeley 2018: 521). Other physiological 
responses to shame may include nausea, chest tightness, and lethargy. Especially even, shame induces the 
body with stress, which is characterised by "a physical, chemical, or emotional factor that causes bodily or 
mental tension and may be a factor in disease causation" (Mish 2014). In this sense, chronic stress, which 
may occur as a result of long-lasting shame, may give ri se to painful conditions to the muscular and skeletal 
systems, can contribute to cardiovascular difficulties and gastrointestinal problems (which, in turn, may 
influence the emergence of mood disorders). What is more, in that it triggers long-lasting demands on the 
nervous system, chronic stress may bring someone to feel drained, thereby diminishing the effectiveness 
and scope of other bodily functions, including reproductive functions (A PA 2018). The preceding 
paragraphs eloquently highlight the relevance of questioning the role and point of shame, and of seeking 
new avenues in "dealing" with it. 
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2SlGBTQlA+ VS Queer 
Before detailing the chapters composing this dissertation, 1 address here in length why 1 choose to 
use the word queer instead of the by now more and more recognized acronym 2SlGBTQIA+. Before 
embarking on such explanation, 1 wish to stress that 1 do not in any way deny the importance of the 
acronym or the significant gain in terms of civil rights and social recognition that is evidenced (in ways) by 
its increasingly widespread collective use. Indeed, it is personally comforting and very encouraging to see 
that the acronym has increasingly become a part of our Iives4 • Notwithstanding, there are practical and 
political reasons for which 1 would rather use, as far as this dissertation is concerned, the word queer. The 
first reason 1 choose to use the word 'queer' is rooted in a political understanding of what queerness 
means. Mimi Marinucci, for instance, uses the word queer following the work of Gayle S. Rubin in Thinking 
Sex (1984). She emphasizes how sexualities and gender expressions are diverse and suggests that 
"everyone is at least a little queer" . "The use of queer (rather than lesbian and gay, or lGBT +), she writes, 
as the conceptual alternative to normative sexuality can facilitate a sort of unity of purpose in resisting the 
hegemony of normative sexuality" (Marinucci 2017; my emphasis). In other words, using the word queer 
does not make it superior or preferable to the acronym. Rather, it better appreciates the existence of 
people whose experiences are queer and recognizes the daims of queerness as important in opposing 
heteronormativjtyS . 
The second reason for which 1 prefer using the word queer instead of the acronym 2SlGBTQIA+ 
consists in my acknowledging that this latter means something. Its letters refer to the lived experiences 
and identities of many diversified people. If can Ilay daim to sorne of the experiences underlying the letter 
41 was pleasantly surprised, for instance, to notice that Netflix now offers a selection of LGBT-identified films on its 
streaming service. 1 felt this was a real step forward, especially compared to the fact that when 1 was younger, 1 had to 
search every nook and cranny on the internet simple to find mention of a single queer film, often in a foreign language, 
and unavailable in my country. 
5 See also Marinucci, M. (2016). Femin;sm ;s Queer: The Int;mate Connect;on Between Queer and Fem;n;st Theory 
(Expanded Edition). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
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G, 1 wou Id never dare do the same for the other letters. More specifically, my personal standpoint as a 
white gay man does not allow me to lay claim to the stand points and experiences of the people 
represented in the other letters: lesbian, two-spirit, asexual, etc.6• 
ln effect, drawing from a feminist standpoint theory perspective, the posture which 1 adopt 
recognizes that knowledge is shaped according to social positionalities, and that epistemic privileges are 
associated with them. This different standpoint gives queer people access to certain strains of knowledges 
and perspectives which are not available to non-marginalized people (without them risking appropriating 
the lives and experiences of others). As such, 1 believe that a research like mine "should begin with the 
lives ofthe marginalized" (Bowe1l2020, cf. Harding 2004). 
This means that, as a white gay man, 1 can access certain knowledge that non-gay people do not 
have. However, this also comes with blind spots. My perspective and positionality are therefore partial: 1 
do not have access to ail the knowledge associated with other queer positionalities. Despite these possible 
blind spots that may not make my point of view as comprehensive as it could be, 1 remain among those 
who believe that research on this topic must begin with perspectives such as mine, which are committed 
to diversity and the inclusion of perspectives that otherwise remain marginalized. In writing this text, 1 
start from my personal experience of shame (as a white queer man) in order to address the general 
experience of queer shame. My point of view is my own and through it 1 gain legitimacy to speak about 
queer shame. Nevertheless, this can potentially run into difficulties. First, while my being close to my 
research subject grants me legitimacy to discuss queer shame (by virtue of my positionality), the scope of 
my analysis is likely to be limited to the shame which cis-gender, gay, white men may experience. Indeed, 
6Although 1 do not wish to expand abundantly on this (since it is not the point of this dissertation), 1 recognize that my 
political stance on queerness is disputed. For instance, critical feminist thinker Sheila Jeffreys has, for a long time, been 
critical of the emergence and the spreading of the word queer because, in her eyes, it only contributes to invisibilize 
women, especially lesbian women, within 2SLGBTQlA+ circles (Jeffreys 1994; 2014). 
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the legitimacy of my positionality follows me both in the preambles of my research and in its results. 
Alternatively, this means that my research may not be as inclusive as it should be. In particular, it may not 
be the most accu rate reflection of queer women's, queer racialized people's, or queer trans* people's 
experiences of shame. Broadly, 1 am aware that my using the term "queer" rather than the acronym 
2SlGBTQIA+ does not preclude theoretical blind spots. 1 wish to make it clear, however, that this is not 
because of any lack of regard for the experiences of these people or my unwillingness to st rive for 
inclusion. 1 only wished to remain true to my own positionality 
With ail that in mind, the second reason is mostly an ethical and political concern. In turn, 1 believe 
that by using the word queer in this research, 1 am better able to (1) criticize heteronormativity and 
account for the experiences of queer people, as weil as (2) not risking appropriating voices that are not 
mine or speaking for others. (However, a word of caution: 1 use the word queer, but it is important that 
readers remain aware that my use is in complete and partial.) 
Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has two chapters. In chapter one, 1 discuss conceptualizations of shame stemming 
from works in psychology, philosophy, and feminisms in order (1) to propose an encompassing account of 
its main contours, and (2) to bring forward my own workable definition of shame, which draws on the 
works of Nussbaum (2004), Bartky (1990) and Ahmed (2004). In chapter two, 1 assess Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick's (1993) account of queer shame as potentially transformational against the works of Ahmed 
(2004), Foucault (1978) and Fanon (1952), who propose conceptions of shame embedded in structural 
social forces. In fact, 1 argue that shame can be transformational for queer people only insofar as it is 
understood primarily as a painful emotion which queer people experience because they are viewed as 
deviant. This brings me to suggest that queer shame may serve as a politicallever, since it exposes and 
challenges heteronormative norms. 
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1. Conceptualizing Shame 
"Shame is what keeps us in line, what prevents us from discovering not 
so much who we are, but what we might become." 
(Michael Bronski, "Foreword" to Beyond Shame: Reclaiming the 
Abandoned History of Radical Gay Sexuality, 2004 
"1 suppose that a lifetime spent hiding one's erotic truth 
could have a cumulative renunciatory effect. 
Sexual shame is in itself a kind of death." 
(Alison Bechdel, Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic, 2007) 
What is shame? What does it feel like to be ashamed? Or to be shamed by others? What 
consequences does this emotion have on one's personal identity? What does experiencing shame entail 
for the way people live together? Such questions inform contemporary researches on shame, which are 
carried out from different disciplines communicating with and influencing one another. The first influential 
studies on shame originated in psychology, notably with the work of Freud at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Having influenced the theories of shame in both sociology and philosophy, for instance, 
psychological works on shame largely predates contemporary research in queer theory about shame and 
heteronormativity, which developed in the academy in the early 1990s. 
ln any case, it appears that shame is an important emotion to consider if one wants to better 
understand the dynamics of oppression queer people still experience today. This is precisely why the aim 
of this first chapter is to conceptually engage the works of authors in psychology, philo5Ophy, and 
feminisms who have 50ught to theorize and conceptualize shame. Inasmuch as there are currently little to 
no writings that propose an exhaustive and encompassing account ofthe contours and nuances of shame, 
let alone queer shame, 1 seek here to provide an accu rate picture of the influential writings that have 
addressed the issue of shame, 50 as to stress its complexity and its relevance. This is an important first 
step to take before reflecting in subsequent chapters on the relationship between shame and oppression. 
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This chapter comprises three main parts. In a first part, 1 will discuss how shame has been 
conceptualized in psychology, by discussing the canonical works of Freud (1905, 1933), Tomkins (1961, 
1962) and Kaufman (1989). The second part focuses on important philosophical contributions, namely that 
of Sartre (1943), Williams (1993) and Nussbaum (2(04). A third part considers significant contributions by 
critical feminist philosophers whose conceptualizations of shame as a gendered emotion are significant. 
Thus, this chapter is primarily a literature review, at the end of which 1 intend to identify a pertinent and 
appropriate definition of shame. 
1.1. Psychology 
Shame has been important in psychology from Freudian psychoanalysis and its successors (cf. Jung 
2(09) to current work in critical psychology (cf. Liu 2017). This section focuses on three central authors 
who addressed shame in the field of psychology: Sigmund Freud (1905, 1933), Silvan Tomkins (1962, 1963, 
cf. Sedgwick & Frank, 1995), and Gershen Kaufman (1989). 
Sigmund Freud (1905, 1933) 
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud is amongst the first prominent thinkers to address shame, namely 
through his theory of the psychosexual development of children. Freud's theory of psychosexual 
development is now famous: few have never heard of the oedipal complex. Briefly, the oedipal complex, 
for the little boy, consists of a phase of rivalry with the father and a desire for the mother7• This complex 
is "resolved" when the boy, who becomes aware that his mother does not have a penis, begins to fear 
castration. This fear leads him to reject his mothe"s (Dea 2016: 71-73). This is where shame arises for 
71n greater detail, Freud's Oedipus complex is based on the play Oedipus Rex (Oedipus Tyrannus), by the ancient Greek 
playwright Sophocles, in which Oedipus kills his father (Laius, the fallen king) and marries his mother (Jocasta), thus 
fulfilling (unbeknownst to him) the prophecy of his life. The play relates how Oedipus goes in search of his father's 
killer (ignoring his own responsibility). When the truth is revealed to the characters, Jocasta commits suicide and 
Oedipus stabs his eyes out. 
8 However, if shame is primarily located in the body for Freud, philosopher Bonnie Mann's reading of his work also 
situates it in the concealment of genitalia deficiency, which is mostly the burden of women. Women, in fa ct, must 
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Freud. It is closely linked to the body and its sexual impulses, which the ego wishes to repress. In other 
words, shame corresponds to the ego's defense against the (bodily) manifestations of the Id, which is, in 
Freudian terms, the main seat of bodily urges and basic instincts. More broadly, shame, understood as the 
repressions of corporeal urges, has to do with the (possible) pleasure that can be obtained from one's own 
reproductive organs, both sexually and physiologically (urination and defecation) (Hazard 1969: 253). 
Shame is also importantly social, as it implies the fear of being disapproved by others when 
exhibiting some behaviours. In this sense, therefore, shame "is a painful affect [ ... ] concerned with sexual 
matters [ ... ] to the extent that [they] evoke [ ... ] the disgust or contempt of others" (Hazard 1969: 253). 
Finally, Freud emphasizes that shame has both an individual and a social utility. Individually, he suggests 
that shame contributes to the 'normal' development of the subject's personality and self-conception 
(Freud 1905: 238-239). Socially, shame functions to sublimate (thus repress) sexual energy into activities 
allowing for people to live together (Freud 1905: 178). 
Silvan Tomkins (1962,1963) 
ln the 196Os, psychologist Silvan Tomkins developed a conception of affect that differed from that 
of Freud by separating it from its attachment to bodily urges. For many queer theorists who have (and still 
do) referenced him, this seemed to point to a queer-er understanding of shame. As Sedgwick and Frank 
suggest, perhaps Tomkins never intended to conceptualise shame in an anti-heterosexist manner, but his 
writings nonetheless display conceptual flexibility and a desire to engage with alternative models (other 
than the Freudian, universalist and dogmatic ones rooted in corporeal urges (Sedgwick & Frank 1995: 7). 
"attain" heterosexuality by bypassing two difficulties, according to Freud's understanding: they must change (1) their 
object choice identification from female to male and (2) their erogenous zone from the clitoris to the vagina (Mann 
2018: 402). These speculations, Mann notes, are what leads Freud to believe that girls are motivated differently than 
boys to achieve heterosexuality. Simply put, Mann notes that, in Freud's writings, shame consists essentially in the 
emotional force that fuels the heterosexualisation of women through their envy of the penis (Mann 2018: 402) . 
(Mann's conceptualisation of shame will be discussed further in section 1.1.3.) 
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Tomkins does not deny the importance of biological and sexual impulses, but his theory of affect makes 
the duality between biological and social determinants even more significant (Liu 2017: 51). 
Shame is, according to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank's interpretation of Silvan Tomkins' 
work in Shame and Its Sisters: A Si/van Tomkins Reader (1995), a proto-affect. It originates in the primary 
relationship that a baby develops with its mother, in the mirroring of their expressions on one another. 
This mirroring relationship is dependent upon the maintenance of this original gaze which binds the 
mother to her child. According to Tomkins, then, it is when this nurturing gaze is broken that the child 
experiences shame for the first time. The original experience of shame thus corresponds to a break in 
communication, to an intersubjective foi/ure. In other words, "we learn what we said/did is shameful when 
another person refuses to respond to us" (Moffat 2012: 5). 
According to Tomkins, as one cannot expect to live shame-free, shame becomes foundational in 
personal identity formation (Morrison 2015: 19). Indeed, shame is central to the development of identity 
and self-reflectivity. It consists of a sense of turmoil and defeat and is activated and felt through the self. 
He further emphasizes that in experiencing shame, the emotional self does not only act in response to an 
external stimulus, but also produces the internai gaze making it feel exposed to its own eyes. The subject 
feels conscious of her defects, so she wishes to withdraw from others, by lowering her gaze, turning away, 
protecting herself. "Shame is thus [ ... ] stretchy and sticky. It constitutes a persistent but ambivalent 
identification to the object that ties both the positive affect (i.e. love-identification) and the negative affect 
(i.e., shame-humiliation) to the self, who is unwilling to abandon either ofthem. Shame, in its essence is 
the refusai to split and the desire for oneness" (Weiss 2018: 51). 
Gershen Kaufman (1989) 
Gershen Kaufman is a contemporary pioneer of psychological studies on shame. Indeed, before 
Kaufman's research on shame, shame was commonly understood in terms of the individuals' cognitive 
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dynamics. During the 1980s, the paradigm shifted following Kaufman's work: shame is increasingly 
understood in terms of relationships between people and what otherfies sorne (Rohleder 2020: 44). In the 
chapter intitled "Internalization of Shame", from his 1989 book The Psych%gy of Shame: Theory and 
Treatment of Shame-Based Syndrome, Kaufman develops both a phenomenological and a psychological 
perspective to explore how shame can be internalized through three important structures of the self, 
namely the affect, the drive and the interpersonal needs. 
For Kaufman, indeed, internalization is a process by which images, filled with experiences and affect, 
are imprinted on the self to form what he calls 'governing scenes' (Kaufman, 1989: 57). Such governing 
scenes are foundational for the self and comprise three elements: affect, imagery and language. The affect 
amplifies and inscribes these governing scenes within the self. Then, through imagery, or imagination, 
these scenes are magnified (or exaggerated) during their repetition by the self. language, finally, 
continually recreates and reformulates these images and scenes for the self. Through discourses the 
scenes can evolve into fundamental 'scripts' which play an important role in the development of the 
personality (Kaufman 1989: 59). These governing scenes, whether positive or negative (i.e. shameful), are 
the very foundations of personality. 
Shame becomes internalized when it is coupled with another emotion and repeated to form an 
"affect shame sequence". In su ch a sequence the experience of an emotion, say anger, is coupled with 
shame and engenders "binds", through which shame is internalized within the self.lfthe bind is sufficiently 
integrated (i.e. if the shame is 'adequately' internalized), whenever a person would feel anger, they would 
also experience shame (Kaufman 1989: 60). Similarly, shame can be linked with (and internalized) basic 
drives, such as sexuality or hunger. This would mean that one wou Id feel shame, say, whenever one must 
eat (Kaufman 1989: 63). While both Kaufman and Freud agree that shame can be tied to bodily urges, 
Kaufman rather situates shame within repetitive sequences which causes it to be internalized in the self. 
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For Kaufman, the scenes through which shame is internalized bear three distinguishing features. 
First, the scenes include an 'affect-belief: the self retains within itself the entire experience contained in 
the internalized sequence of shame and repeats it to itself as if it were a truth about its own worth. liA girl 
hearing herself ca lied 'stupid' by her mother will internalize the entire scene: mothers disgust look, angry 
voice, and the verbal message. She will grow up hearing a voice inside of her calling her 'stupid' [ ... l. That 
voice belongs to a face, but the visu al scene gradually disappears, typically leaving the individual conscious 
of the shaming voice." (Kaufman 1989: 82) Second, they contain images of social interaction patterns, such 
as blaming someone. While not solely associated with cognitive processes of self-appraisal, these images 
of social interaction patterns contain "the basis of the selfs evolving inner relationship" (Kaufman 1989: 
82-83). Three, the scenes involve the emergence of an 'internalized Other, which form a 
phenomenological point of view, consists of the subject's inner voice representing the audible linguistic 
component ofthe scene thus internalized (Kaufman 1989: 83). 
Summary 
Let me here summarize what 1 have so far discussed. If, for Freud, shame has mainly to do with a 
painful affect arising from the exhibition of corporeal and sexuol behaviours which others find 
reprehensible, Tomkins downplays the importance of the body in his conception of shame as an affect. In 
fact, for Tomkins, shame is foundational to an individual's personal identity conception and is closely 
associated with a break in intersubjective relations. As for Kaufman, he analysed closely how shame can 
become internalized through the repetition of governing scenes which in turn create the internalized notian 




ln philosophy, some eminent authors have conceptualized shame: in phenomenology, in social and 
political theories, and in ethics. This section concerns the works of Jean-Paul Sartre (1943), Bernard 
Williams (1993) and Martha C. Nussbaum (2004) on shame. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1943) 
ln his 1943 Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre elaborates one of the most influential 
philosophical and phenomenological analyses of shame to date. His work specifically on shame is often 
cited by queer theorists and feminist philosophers and has been taken up by authors such as Gail Weiss 
(2018) and Sara Ahmed (2004,2006). Above ail, Sartre breaks from other influential conceptions of shame, 
in that he stresses the intersubjective intention of shame. 
For Sartre, one's existence with others under the modes of intersubjectivity is the reason why one 
can experience shame. Shame corresponds to an intentional form of consciousness: it is in fact 
apprehension of the self as it is objectified by the gaze of others. Shame, therefore, exemplifies a 
relatianship to oneself and to others. According to this point of view, shame is fixed, as deposited on the 
subject insofar as she lives with others. "[Shame] presupposes the intervention of the other, not merely 
because the other is the one before whom 1 feel ashamed, but also and more significantly because that of 
which 1 am ashamed is only constituted in and through my encounter with the other." (Zahavi 2014: 213) 
Others thereby mediate the subject's relation to her self and shame thus testifies to one's being-
for-others. To feel shame, accordingto Sartre, implies recognizing the powerofothers tojudge; the subject 
identifies her self as the object of the recognition of others (Sartre 2003: 246, 287, 290). In Sartre's 
conceptualisation of shame, what is most important is the objectification: 
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La honte pure n'est pas sentiment d'être tel ou tel objet répréhensible; mais, en général, 
d'être un objet, c'est-à-dire de me reconnaÎtre dans cet être dégradé, dépendant et figé que 
je suis pour autrui. La honte est sentiment de chute originelle [ ... ] du fait que je suis « tombé 
» dans le monde, au milieu des choses, et que j'ai besoin de la médiation d'autrui pour être 
ce que je suis. (Sartre 1943: 349; his emphasis) 
The subject, however, cannot understand this objectification, for the other's point of view is not hers to 
adopt. 
Shame is embodied in Sartre's classic example of the voyeur, which is strong because it incites 
empathy both for the voyeur and for his shame. The example is simple: A voyeur peeps into a room 
through the keyhole of the door lock. Sartre stages this example so brilliantly and with su ch accuracy that 
one can measure its success by the identification one develops with the voyeur (and his shame) when the 
scene is interrupted by the sound of approaching footsteps. This interruption reverses the dynamics. The 
voyeur is now the shameful spectacle to be contemplated. Hence, he becomes an other for himself. In this 
way he realizes the capacity others have to catch him in the act. "Yet by my very shame 1 claim as mine 
that freedom of another. 1 affirm a profound unity of consciousnesses, not that harmony of monads which 
has sometimes been taken as a guarantee of objectivity but a unity of being; for 1 accept and wish that 
others should confer upon me a being which 1 recognize." (Weiss 2018: 262) 
But what if the voyeur felt no shame at ail at the thought of being surprised? ln a recent article, 
phenomenologist Gail Weiss suggests that a refusai to feel shame in the example of the voyeur may even 
be the most appropriate response in the Sartrean paradigm. "This is because, despite the 'unity of being' 
that the 'possession' of a shameful nature might offer me, it is only in bad faith that 1 could even accept 
the judgment of another that 1 am shameful or even, to use a positive example, deserving of pride, since, 
according to Sartre, a being1or-itself can always transcend through her free choices any nature that is 
bestowed upon her, whether by herself or others." (Weiss 2018: 541) Thus, Sartre's conception of shame 
is equivocal: on the one hand, the experience of shame in front of another seems to be self-evident and a 
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logical consequence of interacting with others, on the other hand, it also seems that Sartre does not allow 
the possibility of real shame when he daims that one can only truly feel shame when one's freedom 
becomes veiled through objectification (Sartre 2003: 261). Because the subject's freedom cannot escape 
her, the experience of shame seems likely to be an act of bad faith. 
Bernard Williams (1993) 
Philosopher Bernard Williams, in his book Shame and Necessity, first published in 1993, makes a 
controversial and interesting point which underlines the relevance of his addition to this chapter. He 
questions the progressive paradigm of contemporary philosophy, often understood as superior to that of 
ancient Greek philosophy, which bases its superiority on a mature conception of morality that the Greeks 
supposedly lacked (Williams 1997: 13). In fact, he proposes that "[ ... ] la meilleure façon de [ ... ] comprendre 
[ ... ] [les Grecs] n'est pas de parler d'une évolution des conceptions éthiques [ ... ], [mais] en saisissant mieux 
ces conceptions et en mesurant mieux jusqu'à quel point nous les partageons avec [eux]" (Williams 1997: 
14). Williams seeks to understand the "necessity" of moral action outside of so-called progressive 
conceptions of ethics. In particular, he distances himself from a Kantian conception of ethics, which, in his 
view, "occulte" "[ ... ] des voies conduisant à la pensée et à l'expérience éthique" (Williams 1997: 108). 
These considerations lead him to focus on the ethical potential of shame, which occupied a fundamental 
place in Homeric society. 
Generally, he sees shame as "le fait d'être vu, au mauvais moment, par qui ne devrait pas nous voir, 
dans une situation où on ne le voudrait pas" (Williams 1997: 109). Thus, according to Williams' account, 
shame involves the internalizing of a witness's point of view, not unlike Kaufman's or Sartre's 
contributions. Indeed, for him, the essence of shame lies in the exposure of the subject's disadvantaged 
position. For Williams, in fact, shame is tied to feelings of power and occurs when the subject realizes she 
has lost it, and hence seeks self-protection to regain it. 
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Shame is also crucial in acting ethically, because it allows for social cohesion. Shame, then, is a 
necessity in that it binds humans together (Williams, 1997: 81). What is more, it is "anticipato,y': when 
behaving, a subject adopts Others' gazes and anticipates their reaction (Williams, 1997: 79 & 84). 
Moreover, feeling shame testifies to the subject's membership to a community and her caring for it. This 
idea is central to Williams' conception of morality, which develop within communities where social bonds 
are tight enough to allow high levels of empathy. This allows for members to care for one another and 
permits them to judge actions and influence behaviours (Williams 1997: 84). 
Bonnie Mann criticizes Williams' ethical conception of shame. She argues that shame rather has the 
effect of destroying subjects' moral agency, because it consolidates them too tightly within restrictive 
social expectations. She also points out, following empirical research, "that shame is bad for taking 
responsibility for one's own actions and is negatively correlated with empathy" (Mann, 2014: 113). 
However, she does not discard shame, as she admits that it possesses some of necessity. However, she 
argues that "[the] specifie urgent necessities produced in dominant shame-based structures [ ... ] are not 
the necessities we should attirm or hope for [ ... r (Mann, 2014: 114). In sum, while it may be true that 
shame is a form of internalization of others' gazes, highlighting su ch a structure, Mann reckons, adds 
nothing relevant about the content and scope of such ethics (Mann, 2014: 114). 
Martha C. Nussbaum (2004) 
ln the chapter entitled 'Inscribing the Face: Shame and Stigma' from her 2004 book Hiding Irom 
Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Martha C. Nussbaum9 argues for a 'social' stance on shame with 
9 Martha C. Nussbaum is Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the Department of 
Philosophy and Law School of the University of Chicago. She has degrees from New York University, from Harvard and 
from Oxford and has he Id more than 20 teaching positions since the beginning of her career in the early 1970s. She 
has written some 28 books, 490 articles and 69 reviews, and has edited 27 books in her career, making her one of the 
most prolific contemporary philosophers. It should be noted also that many of her writings and thoughts are taught in 
colleges and universities across the world. Citadels of Pride: Sexual Abuse, Accountability, and Reconciliation counts as 
one of her upcoming books. 
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regards to the law. She holds that legislations should be enacted to ensure that certain minority groups 
are not shamed. She believes, however, that such a position ought to be accompanied by a firm grasp of 
what shame is and how it develops in people. She believes that to understand this development can (1) 
provide insight into why sorne people are shamed and (2) may allow for a better comprehension of the 
contexts in which shame may be positive. 
According to Nussbaum, shame implies (1) a sense of one's own being and (2) a sense of one's own 
helplessness. She suggests that "shame emerges gradually over the course of the first year of life, perhaps 
becoming the full-fledged emotions only after a sense of one's own separateness is achieved" (Nussbaum 
2004: 184). Thus, according to her, shame is a pain/ul emotion that emerges when one /eels that one has 
not achieved an internalized ideal. This shame, deeply associated with latent narcissism, is what she calls 
'primitive' shame, and corresponds, in other words, to an awareness of the self as inadequate (Nussbaum 
2004: 185). She distinguishes shame from humiliation, embarrassment, disgust, and guilt. 
Humiliation is related to shame in su ch a way that it is the public face of shame, i.e., it is through 
humiliation that a person becomes socially exposed. Feeling humiliated is very similarto feeling ashamed, 
except that humiliation, contrary to shame, requires prior action. Humiliating someone, she suggests, is 
tantamount to degrading their dignity (Nussbaum 2004: 204). Being embarrassed, unlike shame, can be 
momentary, temporary and inconsequential. Shame refers to aspirations that are rooted in the self, while 
embarrassment occurs (1) in a more isolated manner, (2) is dependent upon certain contexts, (3) does not 
last as long and (4) does not necessarily appeal to socially constructed values or norms (Nussbaum 2004: 
204). Embarrassment, unlike shame, often cornes as a surprise, since, were it premeditated, it would be 
humiliation (Nussbaum 2004: 205-206). Disgust consists of a potentially more productive or creative 
emotion, because it creates distance between the real self and the projected self (Nussbaum 2004: 206). 
It is tIan inherently self-deceptive emotion, whose function, for better or worse, is above ail to conceal 
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from us, on a daily basis, facts about ourselves that are difficult to face" (Nussbaum 2004: 206). Finally, 
while shame has to do with the self and corresponds to a feeling of imperfection, guilt is rather associated 
with an action itself, in so far as, contrary to shame, it does not reflect a judgment of the total character 
of the person (Nussbaum 2004: 207). Guilt points to a breakdown in the integrity of the person. In small 
doses, guilt can potentially be positive, for instance, if it aims to expiate vices. In too great doses, however, 
it can fuel personal turmoil and be harmful to the self (Nussbaum 2004: 208). Shame is like guilt in these 
senses. It can be morally damaging for a person to feel excessive amounts of shame, but a moderate 
amount, Nussbaum argues, can be constructive and fuel relevant social ideals (Nussbaum 2004: 208). 
Nussbaum argues that if one were to consider the possibility of constructive shame, a distinction 
must be made between 'primitive' shame and 'social' shame. She reckons that social shame would be more 
likely to incite in people an awareness of others' vulnerability. This would mean, following Ehrenreich, (1) 
that shame should be oriented towards morally desirable (valuable) social norms and (2) that it should 
serve to reinforce a common (social) sense of human vulnerability (Nussbaum 2004: 213). "[ ... ] [Shame] 
can indeed be constructive. The person who is utterly shame-free is not a good friend, lover, or citizen, 
and there are instances in which the invitation to feel shame is a good thing-most often when the 
invitation is issued by the self, but at least sometimes when another person issues it" (Nussbaum 2004: 
216). She remains cautious in considering the constructive potential of shame and questions what is at 
stake in society's shaming and stigmatizing of certain minority groups. In what ways are these 
stigmatizations consistent with the dynamics of shame previously expressed? "Normality" is at the core of 
social stigma. Normal can either mean 'statistically common', in which case its opposite wou Id be the 
uncommon. Normal can also mean 'proper', where its opposite is inappropriate. When social 
stigmatization is based on an ideal of normality, however, both definitions are often truncated, and 
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abnormal people are then those who do not do what others do and are seen as inappropriate or even 
perverse (Nussbaum 2004: 218). 
She acknowledges, correspondingly with the works of Michael Warner, that 'true normal' is only an 
ideal that no one can really embody. Someone who is (statistically) normal in ail facets of her life is lia 
person who is rare indeed, and highly temporary" (Nussbaum 2004: 218). Why then does society attach 
so much importance to normality? Nussbaum suggest that normality is reassuring and comfortable: by 
surrounding themselves with people like themselves and instilling the illusion of their normality, normals 
feel safe. However, such an illusion implies the stigmatizing of others. Nussbaum argues that "by casting 
shame outwards, by branding the faces and the bodies of others, normals achieve a type of surrogate bliss; 
they satisfy their infantile wish for control and invulnerability" (Nussbaum 2004: 219). 
Summary 
Before going on, 1 must outline the main ideas that pertain to shame in philosophy. For Jean-Paul 
Sartre, shame mostly testifies to the subject's intersubjective relation with others and to her 
powerlessness vis-à-vis the objectification of others. Williams stresses the moral potential of shame to 
socially pressure people through empathy. Nussbaum, in distinguishing shame from other emotions, 
remains cautious of the social potential of shame. While she agrees shame can make people aware of each 
other's vulnerabilities, she reckons shame can also tragically emphasize the differences of sorne and thus 
stigmatize them. 
1.3. Feminisms 
Sorne significant feminists have discussed gendered shame. Such a conception of shame is found in 
Sandra Lee Bartky's seminal 1990 work and is also taken up by Jennifer C. Manion (2003) and Bonnie Mann 
(2018). Additionally, Gail Weiss (2018) discusses second-degree shame arising when one witnesses 
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shameless behaviours. 
Sandra Lee Bartky (1990) 
ln Feminity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomen%gy of Oppression (1990), Sandra Lee Bartky 
addresses how women experience shame as a pervasive and pernicious feeling of inadequacy emerging 
because of their existence within sexist societies (Bartky 1990: 85). She argues that since (1) women are 
socially situated differently than men and (2) because men are part of a system that actively keeps women 
in subordinate positions, understanding the gendered ways in which women experience shame can 
contribute to the development of a richer phenomenology of oppression (Bartky 1990: 84). 
For Bartky, women's shame is pervasive and invisible. It has a paradoxical effect on women's 
emotional life and their socialization. On the one hand, the shame women experience as omnipresent 
feelings of being imperfect is part of their subordination to men. On the other hand, however, shame is 
never understood as such, as it is rather part of women's broader experiences of invisibility (Bartky 
1990: 97). 
While Bartky focuses mostly on women's shame arising in education, her understanding obviously 
applies more broadly to other contexts. Women, in fact, experience shame differently from men, she 
notes. It is an emotion which has "a different meaning in relation to their total psychic situation and 
general social location" (Bartky 1990: 84). In fact, where men tend to experience shame as an episodic 
emotion, arising in a context where they exist and evolve in a world conceived by and belonging to them, 
the shame women feel is rather part of a particular and penetrating type of suffering (Bartky 1990: 88). 
Finally, Bartky stresses that shame is distinct from belief, contrary to how Rawls, for instance 
conceives of it. For Rawls, shame is an emotion associated with a lack of self-esteem. A person's self-
esteem comes from their believing in goals and in their ability to achieve them. Shame thus arises when a 
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person feels that their goals are unworthy or that they do not believe in their ability to achieve them. 
Bartky does not concur with such a conception, which cannot possibly account for ail the experiences of 
shame. It certainly does not help to understand how it can be so pervasive and penetrating for women. 
According to Barky in fact, it is perfectly possible to believe in one's competence regarding this orthat goal 
and still feel like a failure. Belief has nothing to do with shame, but contributes to how shame is 
"profoundly disempowering": "what they [women] take away from the situation is not so much a belief as 
a feeling of inferiority or a sense of inadequacy" (Bartky 1990: 94, her emphasis). 
Jennifer C. Manion (2003) 
ln an oftentimes cited 2003 article entitled "Girls Blush Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the 
Problem of Shame", Jennifer C. Manion10 analyses the relationship between shame and gender. She 
argues, in contrast to Gabriele Taylor's (1985) conception of shame, that the value of shame lies precisely 
in its ability to upset the "normalN balance. 
Manion conceives broadly of shame as an emotion of the self which involves an overall negative 
self-appreciation, which points to a person's vulnerability and powerlessness in relation to others (Manion 
2003: 22-23). From Aristotle to the present day, she notes, shame has often been more associated with 
women, and she thus wishes to understand how shame is experienced based on gender. The work of Helen 
Block Lewis (1971) has established that women are more likely to feel shame as a sense of disappointment 
in their inability to meet given ideals, which is further exacerbated when facing others' judgements. 
10 Jennifer C. Manion received her Ph.D. in Philosophy, with a specialization in feminist ethics, from John Hopkins 
University. Very little biographical information exists on the web about this person. She published four papers 
(including her thesis), prior to 2003 (and nothing after). However, 1 was able to find out that in the fall of 2009, she 
published poetry on Wicked Alice (Manion 2009). No more recent information about this person has come to my 
attention, and so she remains deeply shrouded in mystery. Nevertheless, the qua lit y of her work can still be 
appreciated. 
23 
Following Bartky's work, Manion suggests the existence of a dual emotional world that 
differentiates men and women, particularly with respect to their lived experiences of shame (Manion 
2003: 24). For men, the object of shame is often the performance of an important task or sexual 
impotence, while for women it usually more concerns physical appearance or the ability to maintain 
meaningful interpersonal relationships (Manion 2003: 25). She also notes that while many authors have 
been interested in the ethical and political potential of shame, some argue that it is always preferable to 
feel shame, as it is warning-signal emotion which indicates when one's behaviour falls outside of 
commonly accepted social norms (Manion 2003: 21-22). 
This is what Gabriele Taylor defends in her 1985 book. For Taylor, shame is always positive, since it 
acts as an injunction to maintain a given social equilibrium. The, shame is an emotion which serves to 
protect oneself and points to the selfs corruptibility (Manion 2003: 26). Shame therefore has to do with 
self-respect, because to stop feeling shame would mean losing one's sense of self-worth (Manion 2003: 
27). Shame makes it possible to discern when the self is threatened, and it enjoins people to cultivate self-
respect and concern for personal integrity (Manion 2003: 27). 
ln addition, Taylor believes that a person feels real shame when they fail to meet their ideals, goals 
or act on theirvalues or commitments. Fa Ise shame, then, occurs when people judge themselves according 
to values which are not theirs. This kind of shame is dangerous because it undermines a person's real self 
(Manion 2003: 27). When a person allows themselves to be driven by the values of others, her self is no 
longer real and balanced. "Thus, for Taylor one is always better off having the ca pa city to feel shame even 
though this means risking feeling false shame, because feeling shame on any particular occasion indicates 
that an agent possesses some set of values to which she is committed." (Manion 2003: 28) 
Manion criticises Taylor's thinking because she believes that a proper analysis of the social relevance 
of shame must consider its gendered side, which Taylor neglects. Manion thinks that Taylor focuses too 
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much on negative shame: If The more often a person suffers from false shame, the more serious the threat 
to her integrity, or the more indicative, perhaps, of confusion or uncertainty about her values ... she is no 
longer sure ... how she ought to behave or be treated ... " (Taylor 1985: 176, cited in Manion 2003: 34) She 
identifies four problems with Taylor's conception of shame. First, Taylor's conception of shame seems to 
value a stable self-concept only because it is stable. Moreover, her conception seems to imply that true 
values are only those that one obtains for oneself. Manion reveals that this seems to exclude the possibility 
of changing one's values and to imply that a subject necessarily gives herse If good values. Additionally, it 
does not seem possible to assess the relevance one's shame when it arises from socialization, say when 
others judge the subject. Finally, Taylor seems to assume that feeling uncertainty about one's self-
conception is inherently destructive and indicates a lack of personal integrity (Manion 2003: 34-35). 
Manion rather argues that Taylor's understanding of self-conception and personal integrity is too narrow: 
If[Taylor's] conception of integrity is too thin; that her division between false and genuine shame is 
spurious; and that her insistence that shame that challenges a person's normative beliefs is necessarily 
harmful is empirically false" (Manion 2003: 35). Manion further believes that the value of shame lies in its 
ability to disrupt self-imposed personal categories. IfTaylor's analysis implies that it is always a sign of moral 
integrity to dismiss shame that one feels in response to falling short of an ideal (culturally enforced or not) 
that one holds. This discussion suggests that only when a person reviews her values from a perspective of 
self-concern can she maintain her integrity" (Manion 2003: 37). 
Bonnie Mann (2018) 
ln her 2018 article entitled 'Femininity, Shame, and Redemption', philosopher Bonnie Mannll takes 
up the shame Bartky discusses, names it "ubiquitous shame" and analyses it in relation to the development 
11 Bonnie Mann holds a doctorate in philosophy from SUNY at Stony Brook. In addition, she has been Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Oregon since 2015, where she teaches, among other things, feminist and continental 
philosophy. Since 2019, she serves as co-editor-in-chief of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy. She has published 
two books, including Sovereign Masculinity: Gender Lessons from the War on Terror, in 2014, published by Oxford 
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of women's sexuality. She distinguishes between ubiquitous shame and unbounded shame. Ubiquitous 
shame has to do with the status of women and to their very existence within male supremacist societies, 
within which "act like a girl" can be mandatory for some and used to insult others (Mann 2018: 403). 
Unbounded shame is more demanding, more ruthless and more inexorable that ubiquitous shame and is 
often set into motion around a specifie event (which the ultimate downfall is suicide or suicidai ideation) 
(Mann 2018: 403). According to this author, both forms of shame contribute to the supremacy of men. 
She explains this through her reading of Simone de Beauvoir. For de Beauvoir, in tact, who criticized 
Freud's writings (see section 1.1.1), if young girls do indeed envy boys' penises, it is only to the extent that 
young girls realize how privileged they are. Mann agrees with Freud that the body is the primary site of 
shame for women, but for different reasons. The shame young girls feel at a very early age is what makes 
them feel small and make them want to shrink their bodies in the presence of men. The supremacy of men 
keeps women in a perpetuai need to justify their existence. In line with Simone de Beauvoir's words, Mann 
brilliantly illustrates how women often justify themselves through gender performance: "Gender and 
gendering are ways that we establish our relative worth or worthlessness in the eyes of others" (Mann 
2018: 405). 
Then, drawing on Bartky's work, she suggests that the ubiquitous shame women experience can be 
understood through "the imperatives of feminine body display" (Bartky 1990: 85) and by looking at the 
promise of redemption that lies at the heart of shame. In legitimizing themselves to others through their 
gender performances, young girls cling to images that they embody: "How she inhabits, enacts, and 
embodies gender, how she appears as gendered to others, how her gendered aspirations cohere or 
diverge from the aspirations others hold for her are keys to her social worth or worthlessness in a 
University Press. She has also edited sorne 4 books, published more than 10 articles, and has delivered sorne 50 
academic papers since 2000. 
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community of others" (Mann 2018: 411). And it is particularly through play that girls understand that men 
hold power: they understand the role they have to perform in relation to that of men (Mann 2018: 412). 
Shame develops in girls even more strongly at pubertv, which in turn gives them a paradoxical promise of 
redemption: "[ ... ] she will be a prestigious object-she will be allowed perfect passivity, and through that 
passivity perfect power-in other words, she is promised that her present abjection will be converted into 
admiration, desire, adulation, the power of allure"(Mann 2018: 412). If, for Freud, women hope to be 
successfully heterosexualised so that she may be given a penis (and thus have a child), Mann rather sees 
in the promise of power that the supremacy of men offers women a way for them to endure ubiquitous 
shame: the subject sees herself entirely objectified and condemned to passivity, but c1ings to the promise 
of power and the possibility of being worshipped (Mann 2018: 413). 
Gail Weiss (2018) 
It appears from what has been so far discussed that understanding shame also partly means 
questioning whether the people who feel it, should. In a 2018 article entitled "The Shame of 
Shamelessness", Gail Weiss12 examines the extent to which a person's 'shameless' behaviour can influence 
the people who witness it to absorb shame. This is what she calls second-degree shame. She believes this 
second-degree shame has a particular moral characterthat needs to be investigated. Analyzing the famous 
example of Sartre's voyeur (discussed earlier in section 1.1.2.), whose shameful behaviour remains 
manifest even in the absence of witnesses, she highlights the limits of this c1assical phenomenological 
12 Gail Weiss has a Ph.D. from Yale University and is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the 
Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University, where she specialises and teaches in 
areas pertaining to phenomenology, feminist theory, critical race theory and existentialism. She is also the Executive 
Co-Director for the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the General Secretary for the 
International Merleau-Ponty Circle. Since 1999, she has written, co-authored and edited some ten books. Since 2016, 
she has also authored some fourteen articles, book chapters and encyclopedia entries. Her most recent book, entitled 
50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, which she co-edited with Ann Murphy and Gayle Salamon, is a collection 
of "fresh readings of classic phenomenological topics and [an introduction to] newer concepts developed by feminist 
theorists, critical race theorists, disability theorists, and queer and trans theorists that capture aspects of lived 
experience that have traditionally been neglected (Northwestern University Press 2020). 
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framework of shame-before-others by 100 king at the contributions of Franz Fanon (1952) and Sandra 
Bartky (1990). In fact, she stresses how both Fanon and Bartky offer shining examples of how the shaming 
gaze which shows how one can become an-other-for-others. One has very little control over her body, 
over how it is perceived and stigmatized. Most especially, one has very control over how society reacts to 
and exercise power over it. Stereotypes and stigmas are internalized and borne through shame. Following 
Fanon13 and Bartky, Weiss suggests that women and racialized people may be shamed even if their 
behaviour are not properly shameful. Which is in part why she considers the importance of shamelessness 
(Weiss 2018: 545). 
If shame corresponds in part to an urge to keep to oneself and to reject others, while feeling inferior, 
being shameless, by contrast, has to do with projecting oneself towards others, rejecting the 
internalization of shame and refusing to recognize its pathologizing effects. While on the face of it, it seems 
preferable to choose shamelessness over shame, especially because it seems to allow freedom from the 
gaze of others, Weiss suggests that the shame experienced bya subject following reprehensible behaviour 
(that of the voyeur, therefore) can have a beneficial social effect. "Specifically, it is a visceral, affective cali 
to responsibility that forcibly reminds us that our actions never occur in a vacuum but inevitably 
reverberate beyond ourselves, affecting not only others but also the larger society in which we live." 
(Weiss 2018: 545) 
This is true above ail when a subject, behaving in a shameless way, communicates shame to others. 
Because shame is contagious, others come to feel the weight and effects of the shame the shameless 
refuses to acknowledge. Such second-degree shame has problematic consequences. First, taking upon 
oneself the effect someone else's shameless behaviour seems to tacitly signify one's acceptance of it. 
13 Fanon's conception of racial ized shame will be further developed in chapter 2. 
28 
Second, su ch acceptance risks multiplying the effects of this shame exponentially. "Moreover, 1 mayend 
up assuming the shame of other witnesses who actually enjoy the degrading spectacle they see, instead 
of being ashamed of it" (p. 545), and this consequence of second-degree shame often remains invisible. 
Finally, she believes that the positive, transformative value of shame is most adequately actualized when 
it motivates collective resistance to (1) shameful and to (2) shameless conducts. 
Summary 
1 wish to highlight here the central ideas discussed in feminist thoughts concerning shame. For Barky, 
the shame women experience is different from that of men because women tend to feel it as a persistent 
sense of inadequacy. Manion expands on Bartky's conception of gendered shame to criticize Taylor's be/ief-
oriented understanding of shame and hints that the potential of shame may lie in its flexible tendency to 
disrupt rigid (self) imposed categories. Mann also expands on Bartky's conception when she names the 
shame Barky discusses " ubiquitous shame", which she proposes is most prominent in young women when 
they discover their sexuality as a (false) promise of redemption. Finally, Gail Weiss's discussion of shame 
emphasizes the importance of second-degree shame, which occurs when one takes as one's own the 
shameless behaviour of another. Because second-degree shame often remains invisible, Weiss contends 
that the real, transformative role of shame, if any, must be to resist both shameful and shameless 
behaviours. 
1.4. Reconstructing a Definition of Shame 
Inasmuch as this dissertation aims to discuss queer shame, as it is intimately intertwined with a 
heterosexist system which fuels queer people's oppressions, 1 wish to propose a general and practical 
definition of shame which would somewhat draw on what has been thus far discussed. Before 1 do that, 
though, 1 must comment and qualify sorne of the perspectives previously put forward. Regarding Freud, 
since much of his work drew from a non-representative and non-transferable (cf. Kihlstrom 1994; Myers 
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& OeWali 2018) data sam pie, 1 retain little of his work, except for an encompassing understanding shame 
as emotionally experienced and bodily transpiring (i.e. visible). The contributions ofTomkins and Kaufman 
seem to me more relevant to include in an understanding of shame which accounts for the oppressions 
experienced by queer people: on the one hand, Tomkins recognizes the importance of intersubjectivity 
between people when feeling shame, and, on the other hand, Kaufman contributed to the understanding 
of internalized shame. Further, 1 recognize the importance of Sartre's and Williams' works in 
philosophically conceptualizing shame. However, regarding Sartre, as there are now contemporary 
philosophical works that incorporate mixed perspectives, namely from biology or cognitive sciences, 1 
prefer to focus on people who are less frequently cited, whose new approaches and perspectives are likely 
to bring a renewal to the study of shame, while at the same time drawing inspiration from classical works, 
as is the case of Martha Nussbaum. As for the work of Bernard Williams, although he proposes an 
interesting conception which connects shame and empathy, insofar as Nussbaum takes up, develops, and 
criticizes su ch an approach, 1 will also prioritize her over Williams. In addition, regarding the feminisms 1 
discussed, the works of Manion, Mann and Weiss were pertinent in eloquently articulating how shame 
unfolds within concrete realities and contexts. However, as some are more responses or developments 
based on Bartky's ideas (Manion and Mann), and as others are essentially detailed discussions of a specifie 
type of shame (Weiss), 1 will prioritize the ideas developed by Bartky. Thus, in the end, 1 follow closely (and 
mainly) the works of Nussbaum (2004), Bartky (1990), and Ahmed (2004) (whom 1 will discuss in greater 
lengths further on), to propose the following definition: Shame is a painful emotion that an individual 
feels when one of her flaws (real or imagined) is highlighted in front of others (real or imagined). In turn, 
shame is often experienced as an inability to achieve a personal (or internalized) ideal. 
Before concluding this chapter, 1 wish to explain why 1 use this definition. This definition, and its 
main components, seems easily "workable" for addressing the experiences of queer people. First, 
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understanding shame as a painful emotion resonates directly with the lives and experiences of queer 
people, who, because of their marginalization (among other things), have to endure sufferings that (many) 
others do not. In addition, the fact that a person experiences shame as the emphasizing of one's flaw in 
front of others is also eloquently telling of queer experiences. Indeed, many queer people are socially 
marginalized because they are considered '1Iawed". Further, that one feels shame in front of others, be 
they real or imagined (i.e., internalized) is also closely related to the experiences of queer people. On the 
one hand, queer people may be discriminated against because of their sexual or gender identity (in which 
case others may be real). On the other hand, queer people may come to feel"flawed" (in which case others 
may be internalized). Finally, shamed people will (painfully) come to feel flawed in front of others because 
of their (actual or perceived) inabifity to achieve an ideal. That, too, is particularly telling of queer 
experiences, since many experience shame because they do not clearly and properly meet 
heteronormative standards. (1 will expand this last point in fuller details in the next chapter.) Without 
claiming that this definition echoes exclusively the experiences of queer people, as it may be relevant to 
highlight a diversity of experiences, 1 retain it in the context of the experience of shame as it is lived by 
queer people. 
1.5. Conclusion 
To reiterate, the aim ofthis chapter was to conceptually engage with the works of some prominent 
authors who have worked on shame to better translate its relevance and complexity. In psychology, Freud 
identified that shame is a painful affect occurring when one's bodily urges are judged reprehensible by 
others. For Tomkins, however, the body is not so central in understanding shame as an affect. Rather, he 
sees shame as foundational to one's identity. Also, he concurs that shame comes with a break in 
intersubjective relations between people. More recently, Kaufman analysed the internalization of shame 
through the repetition of what he calls «governing scenes». In philosophy, Sartre saw shame as evidence 
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of subjects' intersubjective relations through the objectification of others. As for Williams, he thought 
shame had the moral potential of creating social cohesion through empathy. Nussbaum, for her part, while 
she agreed that shame can make people aware of each others vulnerabilities and foster empathy towards 
them, argued that it can also tragically bring about unnecessary stigmatizations. Finally, when considering 
feminist conceptions of shame, Bartky was truly relevant, as she proposed that women experience shame 
differently than men as pervasive feeling of inadequacy. Both Manion and Mann drew inspiration from 
Bartky's work. Manion suggested that shame may be most useful because it tends to disrupt rigid gender 
categories. Mann employed Bartky's "ubiquitous shame" to propose that young women experience it 
most in discovering their sexuality as a (false) promise of redemption. Finally, in discussing second-degree 
shame, Gail Weiss believes that shame can truly be transformative when it resists both shameful and 
shameless behaviours. Those conceptualizations of shame enabled me to reconstruct a workable 
definition of shame: Shame is a painful emotion that an individual feels when one of her flaws (real or 
imagined) is highlighted in front of others (real or imagined). 
While this first chapter was primarily descriptive to allow for a broad and comprehensive 
exploration of how shame is generally conceptualized in psychology, philosophy and feminist thoughts, 
the next chapter shall expand upon the above-mentioned general definition of shame in order to discuss 
its transformational potential. 
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"Chaque matin je me renie. J'ouvre les yeux, je me rappelle que je suis homosexuel. J'ai 
beau avoir fait tout un travail pour m'accepter, me laver des insultes, j'ai beau 
me répéter depuis des années que j'ai le droit de vivre libre, vivre digne, vivre 
vivre, rien n'y fait: cette peau d'homosexuel que le monde m'a imposée est plus 
forte que moi, plus dure, plus tenace. Cette peau, c'est ma vérité au-delà de moi. 
Je ne l'accepte pas complètement mais je sais que je n'existe que par elle, malgré 
mes multiples tentatives d'évasion, d'émancipation." 
(Abdellah Taïa, Celui qui est digne d'être aimé, 2017) 
"To me, 'queerness' is an alienation from a heteronormative 
code that governs bodies, genders, and their processes -
sexuality, birth, death, and inheritance - in order to preserve 
social, economic, and political power for those who have it [and] 
to continue it into future generations." 
(Christopher Hennessy, "An Interview with Kazim Ali", 2013). 
2. Queer Shame and its Transformational Potential 
The previous chapter was informative in capturing the relevance and depth of the concept of 
shame, as it has been embedded in influential thoughts over the past century. The proper portrayal of 
shame in this master's thesis will need to identify what queer shame is and how it fits into social, cultural 
and sexual politics. In this chapter, 1 will look more closely at queer shame (both at the shame of queer 
people and how shame can be properly queer), as 1 wish to illustrate that it ought to be understood as an 
emotion stemming from heteronormative social structures. In this chapter, in tact, 1 discuss the works of 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, for whom shame can potentially be transformative (Sedgwick 1993).1 believe su ch 
an account to be insufficient, since it lacks a clear recognition of queer shame as primarily painful. Thus, 1 
turn to the works of Ahmed (2004), Foucault (1978), and Fanon (1952) in order to posit that queer people 
experience shame because they live in heteronormative structures which marginalize them. In the end, 1 
will argue that shame, even though it is a painful emotion, may serve as a politicallever meant to challenge 
heteronormativity. 1 contend that such an understanding is extremely relevant if we are to get closer to a 
richer and more adequate understanding of the oppressions faced by queer people. 
ln a first part, 1 will sketch out the main contours of queer shame as it has been conceptualized by 
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many prominent figures of the Gay Shame Movement14, so as to highlight a tendency, from sorne of the 
movement's prominent figures, to propose that shame is particularly queer, since (1) it resists 
normalization and (2) it can potentially be productive. This serves as a segway towards a second part on 
the works of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, who brilliantly captured the idea that shame, as a queer performance, 
has a significant transformational potential. While 1 agree (to sorne extent) that shame can have positive 
aspects, 1 suggest, in a third part, drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of power structures and on the 
works of Sara Ahmed, that shame should rather be understood as a painful emotion queer people 
experience because they are seen as deviant. In a fourth section, 1 argue that queer shame may serve as a 
politicallever, because it exposes and, at the same time, challenges the heteronormative apparatus that 
oppresses queer people. 
2.1. The Shame in Gay Shame 
That pride, today, is considered an emblem of "gay culture" or of the advancements of the 
2SlGBTQIA+ movements would hardly surprise anyone. In popular culture, in fact gay pride is mostly 
associated with colorful parades around the world, whose participants, dressed in grandiose outfits and 
dancing to rhythmic music, cali for the inclusion and recognition of sexual and gender diversity. In the gay 
and lesbian movements of the 1970s (onward), pride, brandished under catchy slogans such as "Gay Is 
Good1S", was meant to destigmatize same-sex desires and to rid it of shame. To put it differently, the aim 
14 1 wish to provide some conceptual clarity here, if only to distinguish between the different iterations of Gay Shame 
that will surface throughout this text. Through this chapter, whenever 1 use Gay Shame, 1 mean to refer both to the 
activist movement (Gay Shame Movement) and its ideas, and to the ideas and arguments which have emerged in 
queer theory and at the Gay Shame Conference. If 1 want to refer specifically to one of them, precisions will be 
provided. Gay Shame (with italics) is used to refer specifically to the 2009 book edited by David M. Halperin and Valerie 
Traub. If 1 need to refer to the emotion of shame, as experienced by queer people, 1 will use (with some exceptions) 
the expression "queer shame". 
15 "Gay is Good" was coined in the 1970s by gay activist Frank Kameny, who found inspiration for it in the Black is 
Beautiful movement (and its slogant namely while listening to one of (then) Stokely Carmichael's speeches at the end 
of the 196Os. As for "Black is Beautiful", it originates in the 196Os, amidst the Black Panthers' activisms, and as part of 
the growing Black Power rhetoric for which people like Kwame Turé, Angela Y. Davis or Steve Biko are known. (cf. 
Carmichael & Hamilton 1969; Farmer 2017; Joseph 2006, 2007). 
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was "the complete destigmatization of homosexuality [ ... ] [and] the elimination of both the personal and 
the social shame attached to same-sex eroticism" (Halperin & Traub 2009: 4; my emphasis). The pride 
rhetoric and discourses have accomplished much in the last decades for the advancement of queer 
people's civic rights. Consider, for instance, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that same-sex desire 
is no longer criminalized in Canada and the U.S., and in most (Western) countries16• But the rhetoric of 
pride would be meaningless without the implicit (sexual) shame which it tries to overcome (Halperin 2009: 
44). In fact, the entire pride discourse reflects (in part) a desire to overcome what the dominant 
heteronormative society has deemed to be deviant, perverse, or abnormal sexual practices and desires. 
This contributed, as 1 previously discussed in the introduction, to the reinforcement of what could be ca lied 
a "cult of normality", whereby gay and lesbian movements (wishing to be seen as "normal", and th us 
striving for mainstream recognition) promote the most beautiful aspects of gay culture. Such promotion 
emphasizes values of respectability and inclusiveness, while seeking to hide and silence its most subversive 
aspects. 
So, Gay Shame originated from those subversive voices for whom shame provided a different 
perspective from which to engage in a counter-discourse in opposition to the assimilationist hegemony of 
mainstream gay culture. At least, that's what Professor David M. Halperin asserts17• Indeed, in his 2012 
16 For instance, in Canada, the 1969 House of Commons decriminalized homosexuality following the adoption of Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau's omnibus bill (S.c. 1968-69, c. 38). Then Canada's Minister of Justice, Pierre Elliott Trudeau aroused 
much controversy in proposing amendments to the Criminal Code sections on homosexuality, as weil as abortion, 
lottery and arms bearing (Le Devoir, May 15, 1969: 1-2). Back then, the crime of homosexuality comprised acts of 
sodomy, bestiality, and was mostly considered gross indecency. One accused of homosexuality could spend 5 to 14 
years in prison (Le Devoir, December 22,1967: 1-2). As for same-sex marriage, it was gradually introduced in Canada, 
with additions to the legislations and statuses of its provinces aiming to regulate the rights of homosexual persons, 
culminating in the adoption of the Civil Marriage Act on June 20, 2005 (Eichler, 2019). 
17 David Halperin is W. H. Auden Distinguished University Professor of the History and Theory of Sexuality, Professor 
of English Language and Literature, Women's and Gender Studies, and Classical Studies at the University of Michigan 
at Ann Harbor. Throughout his career he has written some 10 books and 74 articles on the history of sexuality and in 
gender studies. In 1993, he co-founded, with Carolyn Dinshaw (NYU), GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, an 
academic journal published by Duke University Press, the aim of which to offer queer perspectives on ail issues 
touching on sex and sexuality (cf. Duke University Press 2021). Undoubtedly, Halperin has a place amongst the great 
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book How to Be Gay, he eloquently reiterates sorne of the ideas championed by Gay Shame, and argues 
that the Pride rhetoric has the perverse effect, amongst other things, of concealing and silencing "our 
distinctive subjectivities, our unique pleasures, and our characteristic culture", 50 that these "subversive" 
aspects do not offend (Halperin 2012: 74). For him, in fact, even the use of the word "gay" reveals these 
politics of respectability and assimilation, because this word only serves to "politely" round off the 
contours of and make presentable a sexuality too often judged "abnormal", without having to refer to the 
(perverse) sexual acts themselves (Halperin 2012: 75). 
Thus, Halperin and Traub, in the introduction to Gay Shame, explain that Gay Shame provided an 
opportunity to envision queer 50ciality differently, to question how experiences of shame, which are still 
prevalent for queer people despite many affirmations of pride, can be collective and unifying places 
(Halperin & Traub 2009: 4). More specifically, shame is intimately connected to queer experiences and 
identities, as, on the one hand, it participates in a counter-discourse aimed at tarnishing the glossy politics 
of respectability imposed by the "gay mainstream", seeking normalization (cf. Perez 2015). This idea is 
eloquently expressed by Wen Liu, who, in her 2017 article entitled "Toward a Queer Psychology of Affect: 
Restarting from Shameful Places", provides an overview of how Gay Shame came to be. According to Liu, 
shame and queer go together as she believes shame can expand the possibilities for the development of 
queer subjectivities and personal identities. This entails recognizing that the normalization of the 
respectable gay "lifestyle", rooted in the rhetoric of pride, carries with it the invisibilisation of sorne 
individuals and their stories. Because of this desire for normalization, "[ ... ] the image of the happy and 
healthy queer is idealized in the context of widespread queer vulnerability to poor mental health and 
suicidai ideation, [amongst otherthings]" (Liu 2017:47). Gay Shame meant seeking a new angle to question 
figures who shaped the place of queer theory within the academy. 
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pride: 
[Gay Shame] [gives] us to explore experiences of shame that have not totally 
disappeared from the lives of queer people with the allegedly new-found possibility 
of gay pride. Gay shame confers potential legitimacy and acceptability on the 
discussion of issues that don't make gay people feel proud that even proud gay 
people aren't always proud of. In this sense, gay shame is continuous with gay 
pride, insofar as the successes of gay pride now makes it possible to address 
realities that may not present a 'positive image' of gay people. Because of gay pride, 
we have become proud enough that we don't need to stand on our pride. (Halperin 
& Traub 2009: 10) 
Hence, for Halperin and Traub (and many of those present at the Conference), Gay Shame was about 
questioning the normalizing and assimilationist tendencies of Pride. But, as the quote iIIustrates, it also 
means acknowledging and recognizing the gains and advancements Pride made possible for Gay Shame to 
oppose it. It is true, as we have seen, that the pride rhetoric has helped to bring about many important 
and good changes for queer people over the years. However, Halperin and Traub would rather make 
evident sorne of things that the normalizing desires of pride have contributed to and which remain mostly 
unknown. They would rather see the ailments that many marginalized queer people must still endure, and 
which are caused by the normalizing tendencies fostered by pride discourses, be known to ail, before 
congratulating pride for ma king Gay Shame possible. 
Liu Wen, for instance, points out that normalization, embodied in gays-are-just-like-straights 
discourses, has not really been able to "resolve" shame. Shame, rather, appears to have only been 
displaced in multiple Others, whose marginalization it accentuates in a manner similar to that of pride 
discourses. In other words, sorne authors believe that Gay Shame, rather than opposing Pride's 
normalization, has developed its own rhetoric around the same exclusionary tactics which it sought to 
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overcome18• 
If much more could (and perhaps ought to) be said about Gay Shame's (actual) stance on 
normalization or with regard to its opposition to it, it remains important to note, as Halperin and Traub 
did, that Gay Shame, on the other hand, also sought out to comprehend how affirmations of shame can 
be productive. ln effect, Halperin & Traub point outthat Gay Shame inquired as to "[what) affirmative uses 
can be made of shame and related affects, now that not ail queers are condemned to live in shame" 
(Halperin & Traub 2009: 4). The authors remain uncertain whether Gay Shame provided new and relevant 
understandings of shame as productive. However, they point at that "[disagreement] and conflict among 
the participants at the conference enacted the contagious communicability of shame and tested the ability 
of shame to generate, in actual practice, a workable redefinition of queer socia/ity" (Halperin & Traub 2009: 
15). Such an idea is echoed by Liu, who believes that queer shame ought to be conceptualized in terms of 
its ability to disrupt dominant social norms (normalization) and to communicate pleasures and discomforts 
in (and to) bodies and minds, which are (socially) connected through their intersubjectivities. Rethinking 
the queer nature of shame, i.e. its continuous motion and unfixedness, is what would allow for a better 
understanding of its relationship with the lived experiences of many queer people, even today (Liu 
2017: 50). 
However, it is also important to understand that not ail see the potentially productive nature of 
shame. Sorne, such as Michael Warner, whom 1 will discuss in greater length below, remain vigilant about 
shame and its implications. Warner draws on Sartre's views on shame and suggests that it occurs when a 
subject's shortcomings are exposed to others' gaze. The gaze of others matters precisely because the 
18 More specifically, Hiram Pérez, during the Conference, "protested the unacknowledged centering of white gay male 
experience that pervaded conceptualizations of gay shame [ ... ] to consolidate [a] community of whiteness" (Perez 
2015: 97), which, ultimately, makes racialized bodies "the spectacle that homonormative culture appropriates to 
externalize its shame, while retaining its whiteness, class privileges, and urban mobility, simultaneously resistant to 
and in an exotic relationship with liberal humanism" (Liu 2017: 57). 
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subject has an interest in others, or, to put it another way, insofar as the opinion of others matters to the 
(thus exposed) subject (this point will be explained further below wh en discussing Ahmed). Hence, for 
Warner, shame is mainly expressed "as an affect of defeated interest, but also as an affect of self 
repudiationH (Warner 2009: 293). He warns against the possible consequences of shame, and doubts that 
shame can be productive, because he considers that this emotion, especially with regards to queer people, 
tends to isolate and reinforce stigmatization. "Persons shamed by the nature oltheir desires, in what they 
take to be their innermost privacy, are not drawn into commonality by the witnessing of each others 
shame; quite the contrary" (Warner 2009: 294; my emphasis). 
Through the previous discussion, 1 have emphasized that Gay Shame considers shame to be 
particularly queer because, on the one hand, queer shame offers a resistance to the normalizing 
tendencies of the gay mainstream culture, and because, on the other hand, it considers its productive 
potential. In fact, perhaps nowhere has the relationship between shame and queer experiences been 
better articulated than in the works of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, to whom 1 turn in the next section. 
2.2. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick: Transformational Queer Shame Performances 
The late Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick19 is commonly known as one of the founding mothers of queer 
theoryl°. Her book Epistemology 01 the Closet ([1990] 2008), along with Judith Butlers Gender Trouble 
19 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has had an academic career spanning some 30 years (namely as Distinguished Professor of 
English at CUNY from 1998 to 2009), during which she contributed, through her research, writing and professorship, 
to the then-burgeoning field of queer theory. She was also an artist, a poet and a literary critic. For instance, her art 
(which comprises textile paintings, collages and book alterations/creations) has been a part of seven exhibitions since 
1999, and some of her poems have been published in journals. She also completed the manuscript for Traceable, 
Salient, Thirsty, a book of her poetry, but it remained unpublished. Amongst some of her most important academic 
publications, one can count Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire ([1985] 2016) and 
Epistemology of the Closet ([1990] 2008). 
lOlt should be recognized that the term "queer theory" was coined by the distinguished professor emerita Teresa de 
Lauretis, of the University of California Santa Cruz, in her 1991 introduction to Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay 
Sexualities. She used the term as a way to rethink the way sexuality is understood: 'to recast or reinvent the terms of 
our sexualities, to construct another discursive horizon, another way of thinking the sexual' (de Lauretis 1991: iv). 1 
recognize the importance of de Lauretis' work and would in no way wish to minimize it. However, Sedgwick's work is 
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(1990), contributed to a renewed questioning of gender and sexuality and helped create a space for those 
questions to be raised within the academy. Sedgwick, in sorne of her most influential works, like her 1993 
article "Queer Performativity: Henry James's The Art of the Novel", contends that queer shame is a 
performance which can be transformational. The importance of her work is made evident through her 
innovative and foundational writings on shame, vis-à-vis which new theorists, wishing to contribute 
meaningfully to su ch discussions, ought to position themselves (or offer a response). Greatly inspired by 
Silvan Tomkins, she stresses how his theory, while (it can be said that) it proposes anti-heterosexist 
foundational grounds, breaks from prior Freudian or post-Freudian psychoanalytic frameworks which tend 
to consider sexual shame dichotomously (see chapter 1 both for Tomkins's and Freud's account of shame). 
J. L. Austin: Speech Acts and Performatives 
Before detailing the specifies of Sedgwick's ideas regarding the notion of shame, it is useful to 
provide important elements to understand the notions of performance and of performativity. In 
philosophy, "performatives" are mostly associated with the works of J. L. Austin. He developed a theory 
of speech acts in the 1950s-60s, first in courses he taught at Harvard in 1955, then in How to Do Things 
with Words (1962) (probably his best-known work), and refined it throughout his career. In this famous 
theory, Austin first used the word "performativity" to suggest that language can be used to perform 
actions, or to act. Austin is amongst the philosophers of language who consider that meaning is usage, 
and, in this sense, he believes that performative utterances create something in the world. He suggests 
that speech acts have three functions: locution, iIIocution and perlocution. locution corresponds to 
sounds, formed into words, used in order to "say something" (Austin 1962: 94). The iIIocution consists of 
the effect intended at the moment of the locution, i.e. what one wishes to accomplish by means of the 
utterance th us spoken (Austin 1962: 101). Perlocution, finally, is what is "actually" understood or acted at 
much more eloquent on the issue of queer shame and are therefore truly valuable to me in writing this text. 
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the time of the utterance (Austin 1962: 101). One should understand, however, that even though ail 
utterances are performed (i.e. uttered and "thrown" into the world), not ail utterances are performatives 
(i.e. not ail utterances create what was intended, as some, for instance, do not create anything at ail). 
Austin's paradigmatic example of a speech act, which has gone down in history and which he uses most 
often, is probably the phrase "1 do". "1 do" becomes a speech act (a performative) when uttered in the 
context of a wedding ceremony by one of the partners21• In this example, the locution corresponds to "1 
do", insofar as the "1" refers to the subject pronouncing the sentence "1 do", and "do" means do (cf. Austin 
1962: 101). The iIIocution would thus be "1 wish (i.e. my intention is) to be married to that person", and 
the perlocution would be the consecration of the marriage (i.e. the transformation of both spouses' 
matrimonial status) the matrimonial status of both spouses), when pronounced within the context of the 
appropriate ceremony and using the proper gestures and tools. 
Judith Butler: Gender Performances 
Austin's "performatives" has been taken up extensively, especially in queer theory, most notably 
to question commonly held ideas about gender and sexuality. Perhaps the most famous example of this 
can be found in the works of Judith Butler. While Butler does not subscribe to the Austinian speech act 
theory per se, she has developed truly influential ideas on performance and performativity which are 
worth considering in order to gain better insights into those concepts, and because her understanding 
closely relates to that of Sedgwick. More specifically, she is interested in gender performances. She 
conceives of gender as "an identity tenuously constituted in time -an identity instituted through a stylized 
21 While Sedgwick uses Austin's speech act paradigm to address queer performativity, and while she acknowledges its 
influence and relevance, she is critical of the way in which his theory has contributed, at least in philosophy, to 
"installing monogamous heterosexual dyadic church- and state-sanctioned marriage at the definitional center of an 
entire philosophical edifice, it yet posits as the first heuristic device of that philosophy the class of things [ ... ] that can 
preclude or vitiate marriage; and it constructs the philosopher himself, the modern Socrate s, as a man presented as 
highly comic-whose relation to the marriage vow will be one of compulsive, apparently apotropaic repetition and yet 
of ultimate exemption" (Sedgwick 1993: 3; her emphasis). 
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repetition of acts" (i.e. of performances) (Butler 1988: 519; her emphasis). In other words, gender, for this 
author, is instilled into people's identities through their repetitious performances of certain social norms 
and expectations. Butler's approach "combines speech act theory with a phenomenological theory of 
'acts', lacanian psychoanalysis, as weil as a heavy dose of Foucault's notions of subject formation to 
explain how social agents constitute and reconstitute reality through their performance of language, 
gesture and sign" (Young 2016; my emphasis). The emphasis on constitute and reconstitute is truly relevant 
here, since there is a kind of vicious circle in Butler's conception of gender performance: dominant social 
norms dictate the appropriate acts that a subject must perform in orderto be considered "gender normal", 
and in turn, these performances feed into and reinforce those norms. Aiso of prime importance is the close 
connection between the concepts of performance and performativity. let us take an example. When a 
newborn child is declared "boy" or "girl" by healthcare professionals, this has both to do with performance 
and performativity, because the utterance performs a function that goes beyond reality description: it 
constructs and reinforces a certain reality for those involved (Young 2016). Thus, for Butler, if performance 
is more about theatricality, i.e. about acting in certain ways, performativity implies the regulation of these 
performances so that they obey and bring out certain meanings and norms. According to Butler, subjects 
are not limited to being passive entities, blindly and aimlessly obeying norms, and upon whose bodies 
certain meanings are inscribed. Rather, she contends that subjects have some agency. However, she 
specifies that the "embodied selves" cannot exist outside of the social norms and conventions that 
permeate the "meanings" that the subjects take on. In this regard, she draws an eloquent parallel with 
stage acting: 
Actors are always already on the stage, within the terms of the performance. Just 
as a script may be enacted in various ways, and just as the play requires both text 
and interpretation, so the gendered body acts its part in a culturally restricted 
corporeal space and enacts interpretations within the confines of already existing 
directives. (Butler 1988: 526, cf. Butler 2015) 
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Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick: Queer Shame and Performativity 
Sedgwick's conception of performativity is very similar to Butler's. In fact, she appears to have 
incorporated many of Butler's ideas within her own understanding, as she recognizes how Butler made 
evident, through her theorizing of performativity, "that identities are constructed iteratively through 
complex citational processes22" (i.e., following Butler, through the repetitions of acts (performances) from 
which one's (gender and sexual) identity is formed and maintained) (Parker & Sedgwick 1995: 2). In the 
introduction of their collaboratively edited book Performativity and Performance (1995), Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick and Andrew Parker ask, "when [and how] is saying something doing something?" (Parker & 
Sedgwick 1995: 1; my emphasis), a question even more important, they suggest, with regards to queer 
performances. Historically and legally, for example, multiple ideas have been raised to understand and 
circumscribe exactly just "what kind of statement can constitute 'homosexual conduct', as opposed to 
orientation" (Parker & Sedgwick 1995: 5), with the aims of disciplining (as Foucault would say) subversive 
people and behaviors. In the case of queerness, saying something becomes doing something in the 
simplest utterances, as when one "confesses" one's sexuality publicly (i.e. one's coming out ofthe closet). 
When 1 utter ''l'm gay", say during an academic presentation, it is not an empty statement, nor is it solely 
a description of a certain reality. It is not empty because one does not sim ply utter ''l'm gay" and expect 
nothing to happen. (At the very least, something will happen within me because of the mere utterance, 
which too often still sounds like a confession.) Saying ''l'm gay" publicly cornes with a certain "baggage", 
and it inscribes reality with meaning: perhaps people's perceptions of me will change, perhaps 1 will feel 
less comfortable (or as if 1 were exposed), etc. Aiso truly important to understand Sedgwick's conception 
22 Quite literally, within philosophy of language and speech act theories, "citationality" refers to "the ability to re-
present an event of discourse while reflexively marking that representation as not( -quite) that which the citational act 
presences" (Nakassis 2013: 54, cf. Derrida 1988). 
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of (queer) performativity is the fact that in order for "saying something to be doing something", one does 
not necessarily need to say anything at ail. As a man, if 1 were to enter a room in high-heels and painted 
nails, my doing something (i.e. my gender performance) would infer certain meanings to the witnessing 
people. Even if 1 were not gay, the fact that my gender performances, in this example, do not transpire 
heteronormative norms of masculinity, will most likely have people read me as gay, or at least, as 
effeminate (which is often pejorative). Hence, that one's queer acts (performances) can make one a (SOcial) 
subject that must be dealt with (i.e. that society ought to react to) speaks volumes about the relationship 
between oct (performance) and identity formation, and points eloquently to the notion of performativity 
which Butler discusses. 
Moreover, this is what brings Sedgwick to question Austin's paradigmatic "1 do" utterance. For 
Sedgwick, indeed, "1 do", th us uttered as a first-person indicative sentence in the context of a marriage 
ceremony has, for a long time, been a "speech-oct space" reserved for heterosexuals (or for non-queer 
people). The "1" in "I do" obtains a certain social identity in the social institution of marriage, "through 
state authority, through the calm interpellation of others present as 'witnesses', and through the logie of 
the (heterosexual) supplement whereby individual subjective agency is guaranteed by the welding into a 
cross-gender dyad" (Parker & Parker 1995: 10, citing Sedgwick 1993: 3-4). Sedgwick explains that Austin's 
example would not necessarily constitute a place for queer people to easily (i.e. evidently) recognize their 
agentivity and performativity, particularly because their personal identities are more likely to reject (or be 
rejected by) heteronormativity, to lack a strong attachment to state authority, and to engage in "activities" 
whieh the prevailing social norms might not endorse. Thus, it appears for Sedgwiek that "[the] emergence 
of the first person, of the singular, of the active, and of the indicative are 011 questions rather thon 
presumptions, for queer performativity" (Parker & Parker 1995: 10, citing Sedgwick 1993: 3-4; my 
emphasis) . 
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This is where shame becomes important for Sedgwick. In fact, she considers that taking an interest 
in shame, and emphasizing how marginalized people are stigmatized through (and because of) it, is 
similarly situated with efforts to reappropriate the word queer. Queer, despite attempts at extracting it 
form its derogatory sense, still retains a pejorative ring and has profound ties both with shame and "with 
[the] terrifying powerlessness of [a] gender-dissonant or otherwise stigmatized childhood" 
(Sedgwick 1993: 4). For Sedgwick "queer" is a politically effective term precisely because of its inability to 
completely rid itself of shame. And this shame, as a "performance of queer perfarmativityN, may in turn 
illicit innovative social transformations. More ought to be said about Sedgwick's understanding of shame 
before it becomes plain to discern the transformational potential of queer performativity. 
Through her reading of Tomkins, Sedgwick views shame as profoundly tied with interest: "without 
positive affect, there can be no shame [because] only a scene that offers vou enjoyment or engages your 
interest can make vou blush" (Stockton 2010: 16, citing Sedgwick 1993: 16). In other words, one feels 
shame at a given time partly because of some emotional involvement with the shameful event or situation. 
This points to an important communicative dimension of shame. Indeed, for Sedgwick, shame occurs as a 
break in communication (between two humans or with oneself) that intensely disrupts one's sense of self. 
She draws on Tomkins' understanding to propose that shame develops early in infants wh en they lose 
their parents' comforting smi/e. (This is to saythat a child, at some point, will not be able to clearly discern 
a parent's reaction and will experience shame.) Adults seem to tap into this early disruptive experience 
when feeling shame as abandonment, isolation, or even as incapacity (to perceive the others reaction). 
"In fact, shame and identity remain in very dynamic relation to one another, at once deconstituting and 
foundational, because shame is both peculiarly contagious and peculiarly individuating" (Sedgwick 1993: 
5; my emphasis). 
Further, shame is closely related to socialization, as it affects the way people come across and 
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engage one another in at least two ways. First, shame is profoundly contagious, in that it invades and 
conquers the affective states and minds of people who encounter it. (For instance, if someone giving a 
presentation is ca lied out for being unprepared, one would tend to empathize with their humiliation 
[unless, namely, if one feels the calling out is deserved23].) Second, shame is individuating, and isolating, 
in that makes one to disappear and to hide from the gaze of others. Thus, what is important to remember 
about Sedgwick's conceptualization of shame is that "shame both derives from and aims toward 
sociability" and is foundational for identity formation 24 (Sedgwick 1993: 5). 
According to Sedgwick, then, shame then has the potential 0/ being trans/ormative and political, 
not because of its purported ability to reform or discipline behavior (as many theorists, such as Bernard 
Williams for instance, would think), but because of its performative relationship with queerness. Just like 
Gay Shame, Sedgwick believes that "queer" and "shame" share a special bond, since queer escapes being 
fixed into rigid and static categories, just as shame tends to disrupt (stable) identity formation. Queer 
shame is politically interesting to Sedgwick because it situates and legitimizes self-identity in terms of 
performance, i.e., as an action that establishes and reinforces a reality through its creation and 
perpetuation. And the very essence of queer performances is set against the grain of monolithic, 
dominant, heteronormative social norms and binarisms. To put it differently, shame, as queer 
performativity, disrupts the commonly held ideas about sexual and gender identity. 
This explains why Sedgwick considers the expression "Shame on youl", as an Austinian-like 
23 What is even more fascinating with the contagiousness of shame is that it does not always require the shamed one's 
awareness. For example, let us say the same person gives a presentation, but instead of being ca lied out for being 
unprepared, they wear a shirt which, unbeknownst to them, has a stain that everyone in the audience can notice. In 
su ch a scenario, 1 believe that most would empathize with the speaker and feel an emotion somewhat related to 
shame, even though the person who "should" be shamed is unaware of the stain. In other words, most would be 
ashamed for them (see Gail Weiss's account of shame in chapter 1). 
24These two aspects of shame are also reminiscent of Sartre (see in Chapter 1). 
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performative, far more telling than regular first-person indicative utterances. Sedgwick's "Shame on Vou !", 
like Austin's "1 do", has iIIocutionary force, that of shaming an Other, precisely because it names its intent. 
It also similarly requires the "interpellation" of witnesses, since, as 1 have proposed earlier (see chapter 1), 
shame accentuates one's perceived shortcomings in front of other people's gaze (be it real or imagined). 
Additionally, just like Austin's examples, "Shame on you!" employs pronouns. However, unlike "I-do" types 
of performatives, the pronoun is "you", which serve to designate and shame an Other, while the "1" 
conceals itself beneath a doak of implicity. 
So the very grammatical truncation of 'Shame on vou' marks it as the product of a 
history out of which an l, now withdrawn, is projecting shame-toward another l, an 
1 deferred, that has yet and with difficulty to come into being, if at ail, in the place 
of the shamed second person. (Sedgwick 1993: 4) 
Hence, queer performativity names lia strategy for the production of meaning and being, in relation to the 
affect of shame and to the later and related fact of stigma" (Sedgwick 1993: 11). That is, according to 
Sedgwick, it is through their (queer) performances and their being socially shamed that queer people 
develop creative ways to give meaning to their existence, to appropriate their own personal identity, and 
to daim a place in society, despite the marginalization they may suffer. It is thus precisely in those terms 
that shame has deep ties with personal identity: 
The place of identity, the structure 'identity,' marked by shame's threshold 
between sociability and introversion, may be established and naturalized in the first 
instance through shame [ ... ]. Shame motivates queer expressiveness unique to 
lesbians and gays [ ... ] and [it] "generate[s)" a space for identity connected to the 
[ ... ] [queer] performative. (Morrison 2015: 19, citing Sedgwick 2003: 61) 
Sedgwick's account, however relevant and compelling it is to seek new positive possibilities and avenues 
for queer people to use their shame, seems quickly dismissive of the structural processes which shame, 
silence, and invisibilize queer people. What are the social, political, cultural (etc.) (i.e. structural) dynamics 
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which have some people experiencing shame because of their queerness? Perhaps most importantly, 
exactly just what the content of the creative transformations, which queer shame is supposedly aiming 
towards, might be? These gaps and implicits in Sedgwick's approach prompt me to explore alternative 
perspectives, which will provide a more structural and systemic conception of shame within 
heteronormativity. In the next section, then, 1 use Sara Ahmed's account to argue that shame should 
foremost be understood as an emotion queer people experience because they are perceived as deviant. 1 
will suggest (1) that Sedgwick's account, however important, is insufficient to understand the political and 
social scope of shame, while (2) Ahmed proposes a relevant account to do just that. 
2.3. Queer Shame Within Heteronormative Structures 
2.3.1. Sara Ahmed: A Phenomenologicallens on Shame and Idealization 
If 1 am to argue that shame must above ail be understood as an emotion that queer people 
experience because of the heteronormative conditions of the societies they inhabit (societies which 
identify them as deviant), 1 must arrive at a conception of shame as embedded in structural processes. 
With this in mind, 1 begin by examining the work of Sara Ahmed2S, who develops a conception of shame 
as a failure to achieve social ideals. In effect, in the chapter "Shame Before Others", from her 2004 book 
The Cultural Polities of Emotions, discusses shame by drawing on instances of National apologies. More 
specifically, she reflects "on the collective politics of shame by examining the role of shame within [ ... ] 
[National] discourse[s] of reconciliation [ ... ] [around the World)" (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 102), most of which 
25 Sara Ahmed holds a PhD from the Center for Critical and Cultural Theory at cardiff University and has been Professor 
of Race and Cultural Studies Goldsmiths, University of London until the year 2016, when she resigned from her position 
in response to the University's executives' inability to properly take actions to deal with sexual harassment. Her work 
areas include phenomenology, feminist philosophy, critical race theory and queer theory. She is interested in "how 
bodies and worlds take shape; and how power is secured and challenged in everyday life worlds as weil as institutional 
cultures" (Ahmed, 2021). Throughout her career, she has published or edited some twelve books and forty-seven 
journal articles. Her most recent book, entitled Living a Feminist Life, "shows how feminist theory is generated from 
everyday life and the ordinary experiences of being a feminist at home and at work" and provides the most polished 
version for the figure of the feminist 'killjoy' (Ahmed 2017). 
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prompted to apologize, namely, for slavery, colonialism and the genocides of indigenous populations. In 
this chapter, she questions how a Nation can, through a national "we" that is experiencing shame, make 
a sense of itself. While her considerations on national shame and its occurrences in official speech acts of 
regrets and apologies are interesting, 1 draw here more specifically on her well-developed 
conceptualization of shame as a phenomeno/ogical experience of encountering others. 
A Phenomenological Lens to Understand Shame 
Ahmed defines shame generally as an emotion stemming from primary negative affects, which 
one experiences as an "intense and painful sensation that is bound up with how the self feels about itself, 
a self-feeling that is felt by and on the body" (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 103). Additionally, she stresses that 
shame is an emotion which often involves an intense heat in the body or on the surface of the skin. This 
heat can be accompanied by skin coloring (but not always) and bears witness to one's feeling like a failure 
in the face of others (or oneself). Shame th us exposes personal faults (be they real or imagined). 
ln addition, Ahmed emphasizes two body movements in the experience of shame. Shame acts to 
de-form and to re-form the self and, in this sense, the body tends to conceal itself trom others who witness 
its shame, and seeks, through this flight, to preserve itself (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 103). But this flight places 
the subject in a kind of impossible position. If, by feeling shame, a person considers herself 'bad', she will 
try to escape the gaze of others, because they may remind her of her failure, or 'badness'. But running 
away really only brings her back to herself and her failure. She writes: "The subject, in turning away from 
another and back into itself, is consumed bya feeling of badness that cannot simply be given away or 
attributed to another" (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 104). Shame also implies a form of disgust, which the subject 
feels towards herself and others: "In shame, 1 feel myself to be bad, and hence to expel the badness, 1 have 
to expel myself from myself' (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 104). Shame th us creates an impossible situation for 
the subject: the desire to withdraw from others is met with a desire to flee from oneself. Moreover, the 
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impulse to camouflage oneself when feeling shame is paradoxical, notes Ahmed. The very fact of feeling 
shame indicates the failure to take refuge from the gaze of others, precisely because shame is self-
exposure. "On the one hand, shame covers that which is exposed (we turn away, we lower our face, we 
avert our gaze), while on the other, shame exposes that which has been covered (it un-covers)" (Ahmed 
[2004J 2014: 104). 
ln this context, shame intensifies and amplifies the relationship one has with oneself. This 
experience of being-itself depends, as we have seen in Sartre, on the fact that a subject who is ashamed is 
mostly ashamed of her being otherfied in front of others (Ahmed [2004J 2014: 104). Further, Ahmed 
somewhat draws on Sedgwick in proposing that the individualizing effect of shame, through which one 
tends to distance oneself as much from others as from oneself, depends on the fact that shame is primarily 
a social experience which involves the relationship between two people (i.e. two subjectivities). In shame, 
in fact, and contrary to guilt, the bad character of a situation is transferred to the self, which integrates it 
and becomes its reflection. 
shame, Love and Social Ideals 
Moreover, Ahmed suggests that a subject is only truly ashamed in front of others to the extent 
that their opinions matter to her. In a very significant way, this means that shame implies an emotional 
involvement with others. Equally important, it also means that shame is experienced only in front of a (real 
or internalized) witness. Expressed differently, this would mean that, even when alone, a person feels 
shame because of the other person's imagined gaze. In fact, Ahmed is rather Sartrean in suggesting that 
shame makes the subject an Other for herself: "My failure before this other hence is profoundly a failure 
of myself to myself. In shame, 1 expose to myself that 1 am a failure through the gaze of an ideal other [ ... ]" 
(Ahmed [2004J 2014: 106). 
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From this ideolized Other emerges the more social aspects of Ahmed's understanding of shame, 
and upon which 1 shall build my argument. How is oneself (or the others) idealized? Idealization occurs as 
the subject internalizes the image she most wishes to be. That image draws and depends on the values 
she gathers and appropriates through her interactions with others. Such interactions shape her conception 
of herself and of the others, and they constitute norms and values which she hopes to live up to. What is 
more, su ch an ideal requires love: "[ ... ) through love, which involves the desire to be 'Iike' an other, as weil 
as to be recognized by an other, an ideal self is produced as an approximation of the others being" (Ahmed 
(2004) 2014: 106). In other words, the ideal self, combined with love, is what unites subjects with each 
other. It also fuels the desire to be like others and to be validated by others. The ideal selfthus comes from 
a desire to get doser to others and from the idealized relationship that a subject has built up with them. 
If we feel shame, we feel shame because we have failed to approximate 'an ideal' 
that has been given to us through the practices of love. What is exposed in shame 
is the foi/ure of love, as a failure that in turn exposes or shows our love. 
(Ahmed (2004) 2014: 106) 
Let us make explicit the emergence of queer shame within heteronormative systems following Ahmed's 
approach. According to Ahmed, people, through their encounters and interactions with each other, 
develop a certain idealized image of themselves. In other words, people create a "social" version of 
themselves, in that they idealize and value a version of themselves based on what they take up from 
others. And that is based on a shared social bond found in love and interest for others. What that means, 
to put it simply, is that if, for example, most people consider that a man should not wear a dress, then my 
idealized self (which, aga in, reflects the norms most people value and that 1 have also taken up) will most 
likely not wish to wear a dress. What happens if my octuol self wants to wear a dress? ln current 
heteronormative societies, which are mostly characterized by (expIa in), people who do not conform to 
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gender and sexual expectations are sometimes gravely repressed. Following Ahmed, in fact, if 1 were to 
wear a dress in public, for instance, 1 would most likely experience a form of shame when meeting the 
gaze of others, because of my "failure" to achieve or to live up to the idealized version of myself. Because 
of my incapacity to live "properly", and according to the social norms people around me value. What is 
more, 1 could even experience forms of shame if 1 were to sim ply try dresses on while out of sight, alone 
at home, because my idealized self may weil have internalized the gaze of others and the values and norms 
which society considers important still have a hold on me. Following Ahmed, 1 contend that the shame 
queer people experience (qua queer people) comes from society's heteronorms which dictate the rules 
and the norms to be valued in order to be "normal" with regard to gender expressions and sexual desires. 
These norms and ideals have been internalized by the people around us, who value them in return, and 
around whom we develop our own sense of self. 
From Ahmed, then, 1 get an understanding of shame as an emotion that is painful in multiple ways, 
which one experiences in front of others (be they real or internalized), due to one's failure to live up to 
the social ideals one ho Ids dear (or to which one is attached in spite of herself). Such a conception, in fact, 
eloquently iIIustrates that it is not enough to seek to understand the creative and transformative potential 
of shame, as Sedgwick suggests26, but that it is also important to understand the heteronormative social 
forces that persist in shaming queer people. The relevance of Ahmed's approach is further enhanced when 
associated with a structural conception of power, such as that of Michel Foucault. 
2.3.2. Michel Foucault: Shame and Discipline 
Michel Foucault's influence in queer theory (and, more generally, in gender and sexuality studies) 
26 As for the question of the usefulness of shame, Ahmed believes that it can be valu able in limited doses. Indeed, 
shame can only be really useful temporarily, because: "Shame may be restorative only when the shamed other can 
'show' that its failure to measure up to a social ideal is temporary" (Ahmed [2004] 2014: 107). 
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is considerable, and his work is still widely cited or taken up today27. In the introduction to the first volume 
of his books concerning the history of sexuality, Foucault criticizes the repressive hypothesis about 
sexuality. The repressive hypothesis is the idea that, at around the 17th century, most discourses about sex 
and sexuality became socially and politically repressed, as if, from that time on, no one could discuss them 
anymore. In other words, the repressive hypothesis maintained that, historically, sexuality has supposedly 
developed hand in hand with a certain prudishness, thus preventing its diffusion, knowledge and even 
pronunciation within society. Foucault wishes to stress its falseness, because, quite contrary to what the 
hypothesis would pretend, he contends that discourses on sexuality, with the leverage that power offered 
them, have proliferated muchly from that time on. To put it differently, Foucault challenges the true 
foundations of the repressive hypothesis to suggest that power not only did not silence any discourse on 
sexuality but that it rather allowed for new productions of meaning to emerge with regard to the way 
people classified, documented and analyzed sexuality. 
For Foucault, then, power is productive. To understand what power is and how it functions in 
Foucault's works, biopolitics and biopower are two highly relevant concepts. They are both encompassed 
into Foucault's structural approach to power. Biopolitics has to do with "a political rationality which takes 
the administration of life and populations as it subjects: 'to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this 
life in order' (Adams 2017, citing Foucault 1976: 138). To put it differently, biopolitics is a power which 
operates to regulate society and its people's lives. Following this, biopower corresponds the multiple ways 
biopolitics is exercised within society, and, thus, it is "[ ... ] a power that exerts a positive influence on life, 
27 Michel Foucault is one of the most important figures of 20th century philosophy. With an important background in 
psychology and history as weil as in philosophy, his method of analysis prioritizes archeological and genealogical 
approaches to understand and criticize the emergence of individual subjectivity (Gutting & Oksala 2019). His famous 
"repressive hypothesis" has been taken up extensively by queer theorists. Indeed, in La volonté de savoir (1976) (the 
first volume of his History of Sexuality), he questions the idea that sexuality was socially repressed at the turn of the 
17th century and he seeks to understand "what people's motivations are for propounding the hypothesis. [ ... ] 'Why 
do we say that we are repressed?''' (Dea 2016: 30). 
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that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and 
comprehensive regulations" (Foucault [1976J 1978: 137). Biopower works through what Foucault calls 
dispositifs of power, which consists of an 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropie propositions -in short, the said as much as 
the unsaid. (Foucault 1980: 194) 
Which means that biopower spreads, through discourses, exactly what it is trying to regulate. That is, 
dispositifs, in Foucault's work, are a sort a multi-dimensional and multi-consequential web which power 
uses to exert control over life, at the "[ ... J 'Ievel of life' itself' (Adams 2017, citing Foucault 1978: 137). In 
other words, biopower, through multiple discursive and communicative expressions, regulates what is 
"good" and what is "bad" for one to do and disciplines (viz. contrais, polices) people (and their behaviors) 
who do not fit in. 
Contrai and discipline are not alien to queer people. Queers have been legally and politically 
persecuted in multiple (and sometimes creative) ways for a long time. In fact, many queer people remain 
thusly persecuted in various contexts and for various reasons28• In fact, even the Stonewall rebellions, 
which is today celebrated as one of the greatest founding moments of the lesbians and gays sexual 
liberation movements in the 1970s, was originally motivated by queer people's desire not to be harassed 
and beaten by the police anymore. Stonewall brought together people, who were described by society as 
degenerates, perverts, and sexual deviants, to ri se up against police control, violence and brutality, but 
also against the oppression that was their daily lives. In just a fortnight, the riots grew into a national 
28 For instance, there are places in the world where homosexuality is punishable by death (cf. Uga World 2021). 
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movement and by 1970 queer people around the world had started mobilizing and creating organizations 
to promote their rights to exist and live in a society that would no longer oppress and shame them. 
What is most important here is that shame worked for the queer people of Stonewall, and for 
many queer people still today, as a disciplining mechanism meant to deter queer people's daim to 
normalcy. In fact, for Foucault, shame is a complex emotion which points to one's transgression, i.e. it 
indicates a disagreement between the norm one acknowledges and who one actually is. Shame is 
comprised within societal body polities and acts as the omnipresent gaze of power which spreads shame 
in order to assimilate people and smooth aut their differences. Politically, shame holds relations with 
disciplinary institutions of power and ensures that it maximizes the value of some lives or renders others 
unlivable (Filipovie 2017: 102, cf. Butler 1996). That is, shame, "[ ... ]as a 'naturalized' social practiee, is 
instrumental in what Foucault calls the 'anatomo-politics of the human body' that disciplines and thus 
authors the subject by ensuring 'the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel 
increase of its usefulness and its docility [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic 
controls' (Filipovie 2017: 102, citing Foucault 1978: 139; emphasis in the original). One is ashamed because 
of the political and social dispositifs of power, whieh are responsible for generating and managing 
standards of normalcy. In fact, Foucault suggests that shame points (i.e. makes visible) one's behaviors 
which are considered (socially) perverse, or deviant. This is part of disciplining dispositifs aimed at blaming 
individuals for not "fitting in" (Foucault 1978: 37). 
Here, it becomes plain to see how Ahmed has taken up much of Foucault's work. For her shame is 
socially infused in people through their adherence and love for others and the norms they embody. For 
Foucault, shame alsa in valves the internalization of the sacial political and cultural norms emanating from 
the (dominant) disciplinary mechanisms in place. The main difference to be noted here is that, on Ahmed's 
account, one would not perceive her shame as coming from a dominant system that aims to poliee her. 
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While the social norms which she feels she must follow may be interpreted as a means to assimilate her, 
she would most likely not perceive it as a threat. Yet, according to Foucault's account, one experiences 
shame because one adheres to social norms, even if those norms can be oppressive. "I am ashamed 
[because] 1 have internalized the power structure that articulates me as its constitutive outside [ ... ]" 
(Filipovic 2017: 102; my emphasis). 
ln discussing Foucault's understanding of shame, 1 expanded upon the conception developed by 
Ahmed in order to show that shame, while it can be understood as a failure to meet social ideals (which 
one gets from her encountering others), it ought also to be comprised as the internalization of the power 
structures which, in turn, construct the shamed subjects as Others. Otherness in the face of others' gaze 
(and because of social oppressions) is a rich theme for Frantz Fanon. ln fact, Fanon's discussion of racialized 
shame provides nuances to my discussion, as it iIIustrates that shame, far from being foremost creative 
and transformational, can create barriers within one's personal identity when it is interlinked with racial 
prejudice. 
2.3.3. Frantz Fanon: Racialized Shame 
ln Peau noire, masques blancs (1952), psychiatrist, philosopher and essayist Frantz Fanon29 
develops one of the earliest critiques of Sartre's phenomenology of shame30 by proposing an 
29 Frantz Fanon was a renowned Caribbean-born psychiatrist, philosopher, and essayist whose words and writings have 
influenced (and still influence) various liberation movements and civil rights activists, including the Black Panthers in 
the U.S. (In fact, 'young revolutionaries' such as Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and Amiri Baraka were imbued with the 
critical thinking of emancipation that Fanon offered them). "Integrating psychoanalysis, phenomenology, 
existentialism, and Negritude theory, Fanon articulated an expansive view of the psychosocial repercussions of 
colonialism on colonized people." (Peterson 2020). 
30 ln Sartre famous voyeur example, let us recall, a voyeur spies on someone through the lock of a door. At one point, 
the voyeur is interrupted by the sound of footsteps approaching. This creates a break in the scene. If at first the voyeur 
spies on someone else's shame, the sound of footsteps now presents him as the shamed spectacle to be witnessed. 
For Sartre, this example is telling of the way shame works because the reader is likely to identify with the voyeur and 
to experience this break with him. In Franz Fanon's narration of his encounter with a young white boy who calls him 
an N-word, some sort of reversing occurs here in comparison to what the voyeur example iIIustrates. According to Gail 
Weiss, white people may here seem more prone to identify with the white boy than with Fanon. Two reason explain 
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autobiographical account of racialized shame31• His account is particularly relevant to my current argument 
about shame, as (1) it adds a delicate layer of nuance which serves to highlight how racism can complicate 
the lived experience of shame for racialized people32, and (2) it eloquently points that shame, as 1 wish to 
show here, is notforemosttransformational, but can rather be quite damagingto one's personal identity. 
ln a chapter entitled "L'expérience vécue du Noir', Fanon tells his readers about his encounter with 
a young white boy on a train who calls him an N-word and expresses fear at the sight of him. This episode 
is instructive for addressing shame, as Fanon speaks openly about his feelings and impressions, and he 
relates how he had to "affronter le regard blanc" as a "lourdeur inaccoutumée" working to oppress him 
(Fanon 1952: 89). The oppression which this author experiences when faced with the white gaze connects 
with Ahmed's discussion of shame: the gaze of the whites serves to shame and otherfy Fanon. More 
specifically, what strikes one as most significant from Fanon's account is what commentator David Mitchel 
(2020) ca Ils the "cycle of shame", which consists offive standpoints or attitudes Fanon successively adopts 
in relation to his being racially shamed. Fanon describes his first impulse as the welcoming of his objectified 
Black man identity, in the face of whites' gazes, as a way of "re-establish[ing] and reclaim[ing] one's own 
objectivity" (Mitchell 2020: 361). "Je décidai, puisqu'il m'était impossible de partir d'un complexe inné, de 
m'affirmer en tant que NOIR" (Fanon 1952: 112; his emphasis). However, as Mitchell notes, this first 
this. First, because of stereotyping and what Collins has termed 'controlling images' (cf. Hills Collins), Black men are 
stereotypically depicted as violent sexual predators, with whom white people are unlikely to identify. Second, the 
experience of being is seen as a source ofterror is alien to most white people, especially white women. The first person 
telling of this encounter questions and shakes the historically racist roots of oppression upon which this experience of 
shame is built. What is more, this encounter, Fanon reminds us, does not require any particular action on his part, 
solely his visual appearance (Weiss 2018: 543-544). 
31 Since then, other authors have sought to discuss racialized shame, some by discussing internalized racism (e.g. 
Johnson 2020; Mason 2015; David et al. 2019), others, more broadly, by discussing how race and shame may be 
interlinked (cf. Lebron 2013; Leverenz 2012). 
32 1 wish to make plain and evident from the outset the fact that 1 in no way desire to appropriate the words and 
experiences of racialized people to make them fit my own research. While 1 wish to present how Fanon's account of 
shame highlights deeper political intricacies of shame, 1 am also aware that many other things could (and ought to) be 
sa id about such an account, namely concerning the ignorance of the white gaze and the blindness to differences (cf. 
Medina 2013; Mills 2007). 
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impulse fails because it lacks positive content to whieh to relate: the universal (ste reotypica 1 and 
stigmatizing) figure of the Black person circulating in Fanon's time is not the one he aspires to (Mitchell 
2020 : 361). He therefore opts for transcendence. In other words, Fanon's second impulse, in the face of 
his objectification, is a desire to become invisible and not to escape the objectification that whites' gazes 
make him endure. This strategy also fails because it is impossible to make oneself perfectly invisible or to 
become impervious to others. A third strategy then corresponds to Fanon's attempt to combine the two 
previous ones: to avoid being shamed by making oneself equal to whites. The bulk of this third strategy 
consists in going beyond the stereotypieal and oppressive gaze of whites in order to make oneself at least 
equal to them, and to expose (to them) their mistake. "En bon tacticien, je voulus rationaliser le monde, 
montrer au Blanc qu'il était dans l'erreur" (Fanon 1952: 115; he capitalizes). As Fanon explains, it is as 
though truncating the darkness of his skin meant being able to reach the universal reason that whites deny 
him (and that only them have access to) (Mitchell 2020: 362). But Mitchell points that this strategy is once 
again doomed to fail, for, on the one hand, it requires Fanon to dissociate himself from his own self in the 
hope oftranscending his race, and, on the other hand, it seems obvious, in Fanon's words, that the (white) 
"gaze" of reason he intends to adopt (or incarnate) is not sufficient to undermine the harmful effects of 
racism, whieh ultimately persists unflinchingly (Mitchell 2020: 362). This brings him, in a fourth movement, 
and a bit like a visionary, to seek to transform his shame into pride, like many people (after him) within 
civil rights movements who came to truncate the shame society made them feel (by judging them to be 
deviant, perverse, imperfect, etc.) into pride and empowerment (i.e. "Gay is Good"). As Mitchell points 
out, Fanon's pride is embodied in his identification with his Blackness, but still carries the mark of 
stereotypes and oppression that relegate him to the reign of the irrational, the barbarie, or the primitive. 
"Puisque sur le plan de la raison, l'accord n'était pas possible, je me rejetais vers l'irrationalité. À charge 
au Blanc d'être plus irrationnel que moi" (Fanon 1952:120; my emphasis). 
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What's more, Fanon notes that the pride he displays romanticizes his Blackness and prevents him 
from being more than a lower stage of human development in the eyes of whites (Mitchell 2020: 362). 
The fifth movement (and the only one possible) for Fanon then, in such a context, is violence. As Mitchell 
points out, violence is inevitable: faced with his oppression, the Black man explodes and wants to subject 
whites to the same treatment that they have reserved for him. ilLe [N-word] est un jouet entre les mains 
du Blanc; alors, pour rompre ce cercle infernal, il explose" (Fanon 1952 :136; N-word used as replacement). 
But Fanon suggests that violence only is the ultimate step in sealing a vicious circle of objectification in 
which the Black man is trapped, since violent responses to oppression only reinforces the stereotype of 
the Black man as someone to be feared. And his IIcausing" a young boy to be frightened (at the sight of 
him) is what makes Fanon feel ashamed in the first place, since ll50cial rejection", for people "who do not 
conform to social norms" risks bringing about "frequent and enduring experiences of shame" (Harris-Perry 
2011: 106). 
Fanon skillfully traces a dialectic of racial shame to illustrate the ever-present shame Black men 
may come to experience through insidious (and not 50 insidious) forms of racism. Through this dialectic, 
one can appreciate the relevant distinctions between his interpretation of illegitimate racial shame (which 
arises because of iIIegitimate prejudices against Black people living in racist societies) and that of Sartre's 
voyeur example (in which the voyeur's shame seems legitimate, as it serves as social function [to show 
disapproval over his behavior)) (see chapter 1). What is more, sorne sort of interesting reversing occurs in 
comparison to what the voyeur example iIIustrates: in Fanon's narrative white people seem more disposed 
to identify with the white boy than with Fanon. Two reasons may explain this. First, because of what Collins 
has termed 'controlling images', Black men are stereotypically depicted as violent sexual predators with 
whom white people are unlikely to identify (Hill Collins 1990). Second, the experience of being seen as a 
source ofterror is alien to most white people, especially white women. The first person telling of Fanon's 
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encounter questions and shakes the historically racist roots of oppression upon which such experiences of 
shame are built. For such an encounter to unfurl, Fanon reminds us, he does not need to perform any 
action other than making himself visible to others, who in turn make him feel alien (Weiss 2018: 543-544). 
Fanon's account of racial shame is an integral part ofthe experience of racial discrimination he describes, 
because, just like with Foucault and Ahmed, shame obeys a political and social form of control. 
To explain eloquently how shame can be complicated by stigmatizing racial prejudice and to 
further iIIustrate how shame can be painful, let me draw here on the (fictitious) life experiences of How to 
Get Away with Murders Annalise Keating33, a dark-skinned, bisexual, Black women. During the last episode 
of the show, in a grandiose final statement, she den ounces the "mask" she has had to wear ail of her life 
in order to "fit in", to appear appropriate, or to pass (cf. Johnson 2019). 5he says: 
50, here's the truth about me. l've worn a mask every day of my life. In high school, 
it was a smile that 1 faked to get boys to like me. In law school, 1 changed my na me 
to sound more "New England". At the law firm, 1 wore heels, makeup, and a wig. 
And when 1 got married, 1 threw myself into becoming a Keating. And it was ail to 
create a version of myself that the world wou Id accept. (Nowalk & Cragg 2020) 
The fact that she felt she had to change her name (from Anna Mae to Annalise), in order for her to sound 
more "white", perhaps points to how she has been (socially) conditioned to feel ashamed of her origins. 
The "heels, makeup, and a wig" part is also significantly eloquent of ail the stereotypes she had to 
overcome in order to move away from social shame and for her to "fit in". They were attires which she 
had to wear in order to overcome the degrading stereotypes that transmit the idea that dark-skinned 
women are not real women or are not feminine enough (Norwood 2015). At the same time, they were 
meant for her to overcome the stereotype of the "bad black woman", and, th us, to appear less dangerous 
33 How to Get Away with Murder is an American drama/thriller series created by Peter Nowalk which ran on ABC fram 
September 2014 to May 2020. It follows criminal defense attorney Annalise Keating (played by Viola Davis) and her 
inner circle of students (the "Keating Five") as they get entangled into murder plots. 
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to whites (Hill Collins 1990). Moreover, the fact that she felt she had to wear a wig most of the time to 
appear "proper" is tragically telling, since many racialized people have to experience social rejections (in 
school, employment, housing, public spa ces, etc.) because (white) people judge their hair (Mason 2015). 
When she says that she "threw herself into becoming a Keating", she refers to her marrying a white man 
(Sam) (who had a greater social status than she did, and who had some form of authority over her ... ), as 
an expression of her "desire" to correspond to white ideals. Many elements of Annalise's story are 
reminiscent of internalized racism (cf. David et al. 2019; Johnson 2020), since she was socially brought to 
hate her (Black) self and thus to feel ashamed for not trying to "overcome" it. Annalise's story reveals 
much about racialized shame and how it can create an impasse. The vicious circle that we can find in Fanon, 
and which leads him (in spite of himself) to feel ashamed of his personal identity, is also the one which 
drives Annalise to reject her origins and to want to seem "appropriate" in the eyes of whites. 
ln this section, 1 have argued, drawing on the work of Ahmed, Foucault, and Fanon, that shame 
can be far too complex and damaging for queer people to hurriedly contemplate its creative and 
productive potential. Following Ahmed, 1 retain that shame is a multifariously painful emotion that is 
experienced as an exposure (in front of others, real or imagined) of one's failure to live up to the social 
ideals. We have also pointed that this conception has deep ties with Foucault's understanding of power, 
since, for both of those authors, shame also in volves the internalization of the social, political and cultural 
norms emanating from the (dominant) disciplinary mechanisms in place, which make queer people seem 
deviant or perverse. Finally, 1 have also suggested that shame can be an even more complicated and 
stigmatizing emotion when it pertains to racial prejudice. But is that ail there is to say about shame? ln 
what ways can queer shame, as a painful emotion generated by exclusionary heteronormative norms, be 
thought to be useful? Previously, 1 discussed Sedgwick's conception of transformational queer shame. 1 
proposed that such a conception was insufficient without an adequate understanding of the shame queer 
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people experience within heteronormative societies. Building upon the conceptions 1 explored in 
discussing Ahmed's, Foucault's, and Fanon's works, 1 will, in the next section, explore in a more nuanced 
way the transformational potential of queer shame by suggesting that queer shame can be thought of as 
a politicallever aimed at identifying and denouncing oppressive heteronorms. 
2.4. Shame as a Politicallever 
So far, 1 have proposed that queer people experience shame qua queer people because of the 
heteronorms which construct them as deviant. That was the first part of the vicious circle which 1 pointed 
to in the introduction of this chapter. This vicious circle, 1 suggest, implies that, on the one hand, queer 
people are shamed by heteronormative structures that considers them deviant, and, on the other hand, 
the shame they feel forces them to conform to heteronorms, which reinforces heteronormativity's 
domination. In this last section, 1 wish to see how to disrupt the vicious circle. 1 seek to do that byarguing 
that shame may serve as a politicallever meant to expose and challenge heteronormative structures which 
oppress queer people. 
First, let us discuss how the shaming of queer people (because they are viewed as deviant) results 
in a sort of reinforcing of heteronormative oppressions. To illustrate this idea, let me look at the telling 
example which the "cult of masculinity" displays, as it is present amongst many gay men. On the dating-
app scene (i.e. the Grindr app), for instance, sorne gay men, who present themselves as highly masculine, 
appear on the lookout exclusively for other masculine men (Garda-Gomez 2020, cf. Conner 2018; Jaspai 
2017). Their nicknames can be composed of things like "mas4masc" or "Lookingformasc", and their bios 
can comprise statements like "no fems" (i.e. no effeminate men). In these cases, the priee, for a more 
feminine man, to chat with them usually is to be blocked, but can also entail rejection, humiliation, and 
ghosting (i.e. the other person will stop responding abruptly and for no "apparent" reason). Another cliché 
characteristic of su ch profiles who value masculinity above ail else are statements like ''l'm discreet" or 
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"hors milieu", which usually either means a closeted (sometimes cou pied) straight (or bi-curious) man 
wishing for sorne "adventure", or a gay man who implies that the gay community is a bunch of dramatic, 
hysteric Queens above which he positions himself. What the Grindr scene illustrates is that masculinity, 
for many gay men, is often constructed upon the rejection of femininity, that is on anti-effeminacy 
discourses and attitudes. Anti-effeminacy is "a sexist belief that oneself and other gay men should not 
appear or behave effeminately" (Murgo 2017: 107), because that would mean they are not "real" men. 
What lies at the heart of such a sentiment is shame. The shame one may experience as a result of appearing 
deviant. But, in this example, masculine gay men's shame actually causes them to reject their own emotion 
and to project it instead unto others, in this case the "effeminate" gay men, th us reinforcing 
heteronormative systems of oppressions which would have masculinity dominate femininity (Morris & 
Blume Oeur 2018). (It can also be argued, in fact, that hierarchically constructing masculinity as superior 
to femininity reinforces (internalized) forms of misogyny [Hale & Ojeda 2018]). In this example, then, 
effeminate queer men are deemed deviant, and, thus, are shamed, because their gender expressions fail 
to meet dominant standards among gay men. 
This is similarto what queertheorist Michael Warner34, in his 1999 book The Trouble with Normal, 
discusses about the sexual politics of queer shame. He believes that there is a need to address sexuality 
and shame politically precisely because of certain contexts where people are shamed for being (considered 
as) sexually deviant (or, as in the example above, as gender non-conforming). That is to say, queer people 
are shamed because they are not in sync with current (dominant) norms of gender and sexual 
performances. And for Warner, shame becomes political as soon as people (who are dominant and in 
34 Michael Warner holds a PhO from the Johns Hopkins University and is Seymour H. Knox Professor of English, and 
Professor of American Studies at Yale University. As a queer theorist, he has written the highly influential1999 book 
The Trouble with Normal which has been taken up and discussed by many, and he is also credited for popularizing the 
word "heteronormativity" (Warner 1991) (but the concept has deeper roots, for instance in Rich's [1980] or in Rubin's 
[1984] works.) 
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positions of power) refuse to feel it for themselves (when sometimes they ought to) and shift it instead 
onto marginalized people, who are thus socially registered as Others (queer people, according to him, 
become therein perceived as perverse, deviant or abnormal). Moreover, Martha C. Nussbaum (whom 1 
discussed in chapter 1) comments on Warner's discussion of sexual shame and highlights how shame may 
in fact contribute to reinforcing heterosexist prejudice: "Having a lot of shame about our own bodies [ ... ] 
we seek to render our bodies less disturbing; and this frequently involves projecting our own emotions 
outward, onto vulnerable people and groups who come to embody a shamefulness and a disgustingness 
that we then conveniently deny in our own person" (Nussbaum 2012: 225; her emphasis). In a way then, 
sexual shame, according to Warner, aims to silence (those seen as) subversive people, even amongst the 
marginalized. That is, people who are labeled as Others, because of their gender expressions and sexual 
desires, are pushed out of the public space, on the one hand, because they do not (or no longer) have 
access to public resources to express themselves, to be seen or to be heard, and, on the other hand, 
because their voices and experiences are discredited and considered deviant (Tarnopolsky 2004 : 470). 
However, Warner does not consider the repudiation of shame to be constructive. For him, society 
ought to oppose constructing shame as sexual stigma, because it humiliates and marginalizes certain 
groups, and because it hierarchically prioritizes sorne sexualities over others. In fact, according to Warner, 
the socially transformative potential of shame could be realized if shame were no longer associated with 
sexuality. Put differently, that would require for the primary seat of shame to no longer be located in 
sexuality. 
Instead of finding sources of stigmatization in shame, he argues, we must try to find 
a kind of dignity in shame that will draw humanity together in a recognition of our 
"indignities" or 'contingencies'. (Tarnopolsky 2004: 473, citing Warner 1999: 36) 
His daim rests upon two arguments. First, it rests on a principle of basic human liberties (following John 
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Stuart Mill) which basically contends that people's autonomous sexual liberties should not be socially 
restricted if no harm comes from them. Second, he argues that permitting (even encouraging) such sexual 
liberties may be beneficial for everyone: "When we allow different groups more liberty to construct their 
own modes of sexuallife, moreover, we are alilikely to learn from these 'experiments in living" (Nussbaum 
2012: 225-226). 
Warner's ideas are certainly relevant and make me optimistic that the current stigmatizations and 
marginalization queer people experience may "get better" at some point. However, 1 contend that he may 
in fact be putting the cart in front of the horses in that he appears to assume that shame can sim ply be 
dislodged from sexuality (i.e. while he wishes for it, he does not really seem to argue for it). What is more, 
the position he daims puts queer people's gender expressions and sexual desires beyond the scope of 
shame. As if shame can be overcome. This is not a position 1 wish to defend here. Rather, 1 think it is far 
more feasible to consider a world in which shame, while it most likely will continue to exist, can be dealt 
with. In fact, since queer people can be thought of as a marginalized group, partly because of the shame 
which heteronormative structures make them feel, 1 wish to suggest that their shame can work as a 
po/iticallever in order to identify, name and address situations of heteronormative oppression. 1 argue this 
idea based on the fact that (1) oppressed people, following Medina (2013), occupy particular positions 
which allows them to (epistemically) understand uniquely their experiences, and that (2) these positions, 
in turn, may enable for queer people to create "safe-spaces" meant to discuss and address their shame 
and their marginalization. 
According to philosopher José Medina, marginalized people, unlike dominant or powerful people, 
are better able to develop a posture of epistemic humility, which is understood as one's ability to remain 
attentive and accountable to one's epistemic judgments and attitudes (Medina 2013: 43). For marginalized 
people, moreover, such humility can imply a form of open-mindedness and a curiosity about others that 
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is not found in other people. It makes them question themselves and the attitudes of others. Indeed, 
Medina notes that oppressed people, in general, are intellectually and cognitively more curious than their 
oppressors, as they are more likely to tind themselves in situations where increased knowledge of the 
oppressor can save them from harmful consequences. The eminent philosopher Charles W. MiIIs, for 
example, makes a similar point when he suggests that some black people ought to become "experts" on 
white people: « for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay anthropalogists [ ... ] of the 
'white tribe' that has such frightening pawer over them that in certain time periods whites can even 
determine their life or death an a whim" (Mills 2007: 17-18). Thus, for Medina, the subordinate positions 
in which marginalized groups find themselves often imply that they have a surplus of intellectual curiosity 
where their oppressors can afford a form of epistemic laziness. Similarly, marginalized groups are often 
more sensitive to the perspectives and experiences of others. « They have no option but to acknowledge, 
respect, and (to some extent) inhabit alternative perspectives, in particular the perspective of the dominant 
other(s) » (Medina 2013: 44). Following this, it can be thought that queer people have to "inhabit" (at 
least) two particular positions: on the one hand, that of people marginalized and shamed by the 
heteronormative society, and, on the other hand, that of marginalized people who have to maintain a 
greater form of curiosity and vigilance towards the heteronormative society that, at any moment, might 
create harm to them. 
Given the particular position that queer people inhabit, following Medina, 1 believe that it is 
important to question whether it is possible to create "safe spaces" that would allow for the formation of 
a vocabulary through which queer people would be better able to understand and speak out against the 
oppressions that they experience as a result of marginalization and stigmatization. Su ch spa ces may consist 
of places where queer people can speak freely about their experiences without the fear of retribution. 
According to Moira Rachel Kenney, in fa ct, su ch spaces may foster the emergence of uncontined and 
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inclusive discussions and projects meant to resist oppression through shared efforts (Kenney 2001). Only 
in su ch a similar context, then, do 1 believe that shame, even though it is a painful emotion, as Ahmed 
suggests, may be creative and transformational in the way Sedgwick proposed. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter consisted of a close examination of queer shame. On the one hand, this examination 
aimed to show that shame is a painful emotion stemming from heteronormative social structures. On the 
other hand, it sought to argue that shame serve as a politicallever in order to challenge heteronormativity. 
1 attained those goals by juxtaposing four interconnected sections. In a first section, 1 explored the works 
and ideas of Gay Shame, which connects shame and queer in that both resist the normalizing tendencies 
of gay mainstream culture and both have productive potential. The productive potential of shame which 
Gay Shame discussed brought me to explore the works of Sedgwick, for whom queer shame corresponds 
to (following Butler) a series of performances through which queers develop creative and transformational 
possibilities of being. While Sedgwick's account appeared highly relevant, 1 felt it lacked something like a 
structural understanding of the conditions for which queer people experience shame in the first place. For 
this reason, 1 turned, in a third section, to the works of Ahmed, Foucault, and Fanon to propose that shame 
can be far too complex and damaging for queer people to hurriedly contemplate its creative and 
productive potential. Finally, in the last section, 1 contended that shame, however painful an emotion, may 
be useful as means to expose and contest heteronormative structures. 
ln the end, perhaps sorne could criticize this rationale on the same grounds that 1 criticized 
Sedgwick or Warner, viz. by pointing out that 1 do not really offer a "practical guide" which would assure 
that shame may create the " safe-space" 1 aim for. While that may be true, 1 console myself with the belief 
that 1 do not unrealistically claim that we could ever get rid of shame, as it is a human emotion which 
exists. Amongst the things that are left to do, in the perspective 1 developed, the n, is to stay humble 
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towards others' input and to stay optimistic that su ch discussions may bring us doser to a shared 
understanding capable of unsettling heteronorms. 
68 
Conclusion 
It was in high school that 1 my awareness of homophobia grew. Of course, 1 knew before that 1 wasn't 
really supposed to feel the way 1 did, but 1 had never realized that hating and discriminating against queer 
and gender nonconforming people had a name. In high school, as 1 was coming to terms with my own 
sexuality, 1 remember having clear moments of realizations. Of realizing that life was going to be different. 
That for sorne queers, it is not only radically different, but also extremely cruel and demanding. While 1 
was starting to embrace my difference and my uniqueness, 1 became ail too aware as weil of the traumas 
sorne queer people (have to) face because of their differences. In high school, 1 remember that posters 
were put up and pamphlets were distributed to inform us about homosexuality, homophobia, or related 
"issues". One of the posters that most struck provided information about the International Day Against 
Homophobia (which is now called International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia). 
While that day is formerly observed since around 2005, 1 remember that 1 first acknowledged its existence 
through this poster in my second high school year (because that same summer 1 came out to my parents), 
which was 2008-09. That poster struck me because it was one of the first "hard evidence" that 1 came 
across where people like me not only were discriminated against but cou Id also get together and fight it. 1 
remember asking for a poster to put on my bedroom wall, and 1 even hand-made myself a t-shirt to 
"promote" that day. When my parents and sibling questioned me about it, 1 felt utterly silly and ashamed. 
For a long time, 1 cou Id not clearly discern exactly why 1 felt ashamed in that instance. While writing 
this dissertation, this story came back to me. Ilacked the wit and insight to explain to my family what 1 was 
going through. Besides, 1 do not imagine that 1 would have had an adequate place where 1 would have felt 
comfortable to have this conversation with them at that moment. My shame was too great and my words 
too small. That is probably, at least in part, why 1 wrote this dissertation in the way 1 did. To propose the 
basis for thinking about the shame that queer people feel, and to try to see if we could not create places 
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for them to talk and communicate their experiences of shame without fear. Without having to keep it to 
themselves. Without these experiences becoming traumatie. To see if from these experiences and 
moments of shame a discussion could be had that wou Id help us grow. 
ln short, the point of this dissertation was to discuss shame and its transformative potential for 
queer people. Some authors believe that queer shame foremost is positive and potentially transformative 
for queer people's sense of self. 1 rather proposed, following both a thorough conceptualization of shame 
and an illustration of its place within heteronormative structures, that queer shame may only ever be said 
transformative insofar as we adequately comprehend this emotion as painful for queer people, whose 
lives in heteronormative societies are particularly marked by "non-conformity". Chapter one was meant 
as an exploration of the different conceptualizations of shame that authors in psychology, philosophy and 
feminisms have elaborated. From them, 1 concocted my own interpretation to propose that shame can be 
understood as a pain fui emotion that an individual feels when one of her flaws (real or imagined) is 
highlighted in front of others (real or imagined). 1 further drew on this understanding in chapter two, which 
aim it was to examine closely queer shame. 1 suggested that shame, while it is a painful emotion stemming 
from heteronormative social structures, may politically challenge this heteronormative societies. 
1 believe that this dissertation makes a valuable theoretieal contribution by offering a detailed and 
nuanced understanding of the shame that queer people experience as a result of living within 
heteronormative societies. Furthermore, 1 have explored my topie by studying women, racialized people, 
and (otherwise) marginalized people. This is consistent with and puts into practiee the underlying premise 
of this dissertation, whieh is that a better understanding of the experiences of queer people is more likely 
to bring us closerto a more inclusive and life-affirming society. However, perhaps a limitation of my project 
is that 1 have studied su ch an important emotion as shame without great reference to psychology. 
Additionally, in this essay, 1 have used the word "queer" for ethieal and politieal purposes in a way that 
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encompasses many diverse experiences. 1 would readily acknowledge the limitation of my project if 1 were 
blamed for not addressing the experiences of queer people in a way that captured their richness and 
diversity. 1 stand by my political use of "queer" and regret my (potential) lack of diversity. 
While 1 have addressed, and proposed an argument for, the transformational potential of queer 
shame in this dissertation, 1 believe much more ought to be developed with regards to queer shame. For 
instance, meaningful work could be developed to address important and pressing issues that lie at the 
intersection of sexual orientation and race. In effect, while some authors have discussed racialized shame 
(cf. Johnson 2020; Mason 2015; David et al. 2019; lebron 2013; leverenz 2012) or queerness and 
racialization (cf. Johnson 2016; Johnson & Henderson 2005; Johnson & Rivera-$ervera 2016), perhaps the 
question of queer racialized shame ought to receive more attention. 
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